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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of the CEO’s View of Risk on Turnover and the Value  
of Equity. (August 2010) 
Timothy Colin Campbell, B.B.A., James Madison University; 
M.S., Arizona State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Shane A. Johnson 
 
 Recent theory predicts that two factors influencing the CEO’s view of risk, 
overconfidence and debt-like compensation, have implications for CEO forced turnover 
and firm equity value, respectively. We test each of these predictions using large 
samples of CEOs from S&P 1500 firms, with statistical methods such as Cox 
proportional semi-parametric hazard models and Ordinary Least Squares regressions.  
Section 2 tests the theoretical prediction that CEOs with excessively low or 
excessively high overconfidence face a higher likelihood of forced turnover. We find 
empirical support for this prediction: excessively overconfident (diffident) CEOs have 
forced turnover hazard rates approximately 67% (97%) higher than moderately 
overconfident CEOs. To the extent that boards terminate non-value-maximizing CEOs, 
the results are broadly consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of 
managerial overconfidence that maximizes firm value.  
Section 3 tests the theoretical prediction that debt or debt-like compensation can 
be used as a part of optimal executive compensation, leading to an increase in the value 
  
iv 
of equity. We find weak evidence of positive abnormal returns in response to decreases 
in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-equity when the CEO’s debt-to-equity was 
less than the firm’s or when then firm had low institutional ownership. The results 
suggest that the optimal use of debt compensation can in fact be beneficial to equity 
holders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Recent theory has made two interesting predictions. First, new theory predicts 
that CEO overconfidence, a form of bias, can actually benefit the firm. Specifically, 
moderate overconfidence can offset agency conflicts due to CEO risk aversion, and 
actually increase firm value. A resulting prediction is that excessively overconfident 
CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs should have a greater likelihood of forced 
turnover than moderately overconfident CEOs. We test this prediction in Section 2, and 
find empirical support for this prediction: excessively overconfident (diffident) CEOs 
have forced turnover hazard rates approximately 67% (97%) higher than moderately 
overconfident CEOs. By comparison, a CEO who generates industry-adjusted stock 
returns two standard deviations below the mean is 65% more likely to face forced 
termination than the mean CEO. To the extent that boards terminate non-value-
maximizing CEOs, the results are broadly consistent with the view that there is an 
interior optimum level of managerial overconfidence that maximizes firm value. 
 New theoretical predictions also suggest that debt or debt-like compensation can 
be used as a part of optimal executive compensation. In fact, debt compensation may 
lead to a decrease in the agency costs of debt and an increase in the value of equity when 
used optimally. In Section 3, we estimate multiple empirical models for the optimal level 
of CEO debt-to-equity to determine the impact of a deviation from the optimal level on 
firm equity value. We find weak evidence of positive abnormal returns in response to  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Financial Economics. 
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decreases in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-equity when the CEO’s debt-to-
equity was less than the firm’s or when then firm had low institutional ownership. 
Specifically, we find approximately a 1% positive abnormal stock return over the two-
day event window for the firm’s proxy release date and the following day in response to 
a large decrease in the distance from optimal CEO relative debt to equity. The results 
suggest that the optimal use of debt compensation can in fact be beneficial to equity 
holders.  
 Taken together, the evidence provides support for theoretical predictions linking 
factors that influence the CEO’s view of risk, such as overconfidence and debt-like 
compensation, to the value of the firm and its equity and to the CEO’s likelihood of 
being fired. These results suggests that the CEO’s view of risk is an important 
consideration for the firm, as are any factors that would influence the way in which the 
CEO views the firm’s risk or his/her control of that risk. 
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2. THE IMPACT OF CEO CONFIDENCE ON FORCED TURNOVER 
 
2.1 Introduction to Section 2 
Goel and Thakor (2008) study theoretically the effects of three levels of CEO 
confidence—excessive diffidence (low confidence), moderate overconfidence, and 
excessive overconfidence—on investment policy and firm value. In their model, 
moderate levels of overconfidence cause the decision making of risk-averse CEOs to 
approach that of a risk-neutral CEO, and thereby increase firm value. Excessively 
overconfident CEOs overestimate the precision of their information and underinvest in 
information acquisition, leading them to overinvest in projects and reduce firm value. 
CEOs who are excessively diffident also reduce firm value because they reject profitable 
projects that would have increased shareholder wealth. Boards of directors learn about 
their CEOs’ confidence levels by observing whether CEOs accept or reject investment 
projects conditional on signals of the projects’ quality levels. A key resulting prediction 
is that boards of directors will fire CEOs who are excessively overconfident and those 
who are excessively diffident, retaining instead CEOs with moderate overconfidence 
because they maximize firm value. We test this prediction using a large sample of CEOs 
and forced turnover events. 
 We classify all CEOs in the ExecuComp database as excessively diffident, 
moderately overconfident, or excessively overconfident. To identify excessively 
overconfident CEOs, we use a modified version of the stock option-based 
overconfidence measure from Malmendier and Tate (2005), in which overconfident 
CEOs are those who hold options very deep in the money. As an additional measure of 
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excessive overconfidence, we draw upon Malmendier and Tate’s measure based on a 
CEO’s net purchases of shares of stock. We modify both of these measures by 
establishing classification cutoffs closer to the overconfident end of the continuum. As 
complements to the excessive overconfidence measures, we develop measures of 
excessive CEO diffidence.
1
 Based on the reverse logic of the option-holding-based 
measure of excessive overconfidence, we define an excessively diffident CEO as one 
who exercises stock options too early at low levels of moneyness. As a complement to 
the net stock purchase-based measure of excessive overconfidence, we define CEOs as 
excessively diffident if they sell relatively large amounts of their stock holdings. 
Moderately overconfident CEOs are those not classified as excessively overconfident or 
excessively diffident. As a robustness measure of confidence that is not directly related 
to components of CEO compensation, we use firms’ investment levels to construct 
indicator variables for CEO confidence.  
We then identify all CEO turnover events among our set of classified CEOs, and 
classify the turnovers as forced or unforced based on Parrino (1997). Given that some of 
the confidence measures are likely related to stock returns and that extant studies find 
that boards are more likely to terminate CEOs with poor performance, we control for 
firms’ stock return performance. Goel and Thakor (2008) also predict that boards 
terminate low-ability CEOs regardless of their confidence level, which is an additional 
                                                 
1
 One can view the group of CEOs that we call excessively diffident as either excessively diffident or just 
less confident than moderately overconfident CEOs (even rational, correctly confident) with no change in 
the predictions regarding turnover. 
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reason to control for stock return performance. We also control for the fraction of firm 
equity a CEO owns, and CEO age, tenure, salary, and bonus.  
The results provide strong support for Goel and Thakor’s (2008) hypothesis that 
both excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs should face a 
greater likelihood of forced turnover than CEOs with moderate overconfidence. The 
effects are statistically and economically significant: Averaged across the different 
measures, excessively overconfident (diffident) CEOs are 67% (97%) more likely to 
face forced turnover than moderately overconfident CEOs. Moreover, these two 
probabilities do not differ significantly from each other, which implies that excessively 
overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs do not face significantly different 
risks of forced turnover. To put the figures in perspective, a CEO who generates 
industry-adjusted stock returns two standard deviations below the mean is 65% more 
likely to face termination than a CEO who generates mean returns. Thus, the effects of 
CEO confidence on turnover are large compared to other important determinants of 
forced turnover. The results hold in nonparametric, semiparametric, and parametric 
analyses. As expected from the underlying theory, we find consistent evidence of a 
relation between forced turnover and the confidence measures only among firms with 
strong board governance; confidence levels have no reliable effect on forced turnover 
among firms with weak board governance.  
 The excessive overconfidence and excessive diffidence measures could capture 
some effect related to turnovers per se, rather than forced turnovers. To rule out this 
possibility, we conduct two additional tests. First, we exclude all nonturnover 
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observations from the regressions, so that we compare only forced turnovers to voluntary 
turnovers. Among this subset, we find that excessively overconfident CEOs and 
excessively diffident CEOs are significantly more likely than moderately overconfident 
CEOs to face forced turnover rather than voluntary turnover. Second, we exclude all 
forced turnover observations, so that we compare only voluntary turnovers to 
nonturnovers. We find that the measures of excessive overconfidence and excessive 
diffidence are not reliably related to the likelihood that a CEO turns over voluntarily. 
These two tests imply that the measures of excessive overconfidence and excessive 
diffidence are related specifically to forced turnover, and not to turnover in general. 
These tests provide indirect support for the view that excessively overconfident CEOs 
and excessively diffident CEOs do not maximize firm value, so they are subject to 
forced turnover, and not voluntary turnover. Stated differently, the results are broadly 
consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial 
overconfidence that maximizes firm value.  
Another possible interpretation is that the measures of excessive overconfidence 
and excessive diffidence are just proxies for risk aversion. In particular, CEOs that we 
classify as excessively overconfident because they hold options deep in the money, or 
purchase large amounts of their firm’s stock, may just have little or no risk aversion. 
Goel and Thakor (2008), however, emphasize that firm value should increase as risk 
aversion falls, which implies that CEOs identified as excessively overconfident by these 
measures should maximize firm value and therefore, be less subject to forced turnover 
compared to CEOs with moderate overconfidence. But this is opposite of what we find. 
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Thus, the excessive overconfidence measure is unlikely to just identify CEOs with little 
or no risk aversion. 
Our results extend the growing literature on the impact of overconfidence on 
CEO decision-making and firm value. Most directly, our results support key predictions 
about the relation between CEO turnover and CEO confidence from Goel and Thakor 
(2008). By showing that moderately overconfident CEOs are less likely to be terminated, 
our results also provide indirect support for Hackbarth’s (2008) model of capital 
structure with CEO overconfidence and/or optimism. In Hackbarth (2008), there is an 
interior optimum level of CEO overconfidence that maximizes firm value—it is 
straightforward to argue that if moderately overconfident CEOs maximize firm value, 
they should be less subject to forced turnover. Our results also suggest that CEO 
compensation contracts either cannot, or in practice do not, completely offset suboptimal 
levels of managerial overconfidence (see Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2008). 
Our research also extends the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) by 
developing measures that extend the CEO confidence classifications to include 
excessively diffident CEOs. To our knowledge, we are the first to document empirically 
the different effects of very low, moderate, and very high levels of CEO confidence. Our 
results also demonstrate that one can construct useful stock option exercise-based 
confidence measures similar to those in Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) using 
ExecuComp data rather than the more detailed, proprietary data that they use. This could 
prove useful to future researchers because ExecuComp data are available for a large 
number of executives over a long time period. Our results also contribute to the large 
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literature on CEO turnover.
2
 We show that the effects of CEO overconfidence and CEO 
diffidence are economically large determinants of CEO turnover, after controlling for the 
determinants that prior literature has found to be important.  
2.2 Background and hypotheses 
 We focus on testing a key prediction from Goel and Thakor (2008). Thus, we 
first review the relevant results of their model. They first demonstrate that when 
managerial ability cannot be observed and firms promote managers with the highest 
realized returns from the projects they selected, ceteris paribus, promoted managers that 
compose the potential CEO labor pool are likely to be relatively more overconfident than 
other managers. This result provides a strong theoretical underpinning for the notion that 
CEOs might be expected to be overconfident and is consistent with empirical evidence 
exploring managerial confidence levels.  
Goel and Thakor (2008) then move on to consider the board's decision whether to 
retain or fire in-place CEOs with different confidence levels. Excessive diffidence, or 
low confidence, will lead a risk-averse CEO to forego some positive net present value 
projects that are risky despite positive quality signals about the projects. This is 
suboptimal to shareholders who would prefer that a CEO accept all positive NPV 
projects. At moderate levels of overconfidence, a CEO's actions will approach those of a 
risk-neutral manager, leading to a greater number of risky positive NPV projects being 
accepted, and thereby to an increase in firm value. Beyond some level of 
                                                 
2
 See e.g., Weisbach (1988, 1995), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Parrino 
(1997), Defond and Park (1999), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Farrell and Whidbee (2003), Engel, 
Hays, and Wang (2003), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), Defond and Hung (2004), Huson, Malatesta, and 
Parrino (2004), Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005), Lehn and Zhao (2006), Jenter and Kanaan 
(2008), and Peters and Wagner (2009). 
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overconfidence, however, CEOs overestimate the precision of their information and 
underinvest in information acquisition. Given the information-related problems, they 
wind up accepting negative NPV projects (i.e., overinvesting), which reduces firm value.  
Collecting the results, the authors predict that a board of directors acting in the 
best interest of shareholders will recognize that moderate CEO overconfidence is 
beneficial to shareholders, and will fire CEOs with excessive diffidence and those with 
excessive overconfidence. In short, unobservable information prevents the board of 
directors from initially hiring CEOs with the optimal level of confidence, so they correct 
any mistakes later via forced turnover when they learn more about the CEO’s confidence 
level by observing her investment decisions conditional on project quality signals. This 
is the main hypothesis we test. Specifically, CEOs who display excessive diffidence and 
CEOs who display excessive overconfidence will face higher rates of forced turnover 
than CEOs with moderate levels of overconfidence.  
We should emphasize that in Goel and Thakor (2008), boards terminate low- 
ability CEOs, regardless of the CEO’s confidence level. Thus, it is important that we 
control for CEO ability. As we describe in the next subsection, we include controls for 
CEO age, tenure, cash compensation, and the industry-adjusted stock returns over the 
CEO’s tenure. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that CEO tenure and past 
performance capture CEOs’ ―perceived‖ ability, so our tests should be able to separate 
out the effects of low ability from the effects of confidence on forced turnover.  
We should also emphasize that in Goel and Thakor (2008), CEO overconfidence 
is a distinct effect that is separate from low risk aversion. They argue that firm value 
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should have an inverse U-shaped relation with CEO confidence, but that firm value 
should increase monotonically as risk aversion falls. Thus, if our empirical measures of 
excessive overconfidence and excessive diffidence reflect only information about low 
and high CEO risk aversion, respectively, we should find that CEOs that we classify as 
excessively diffident are more likely to be terminated, whereas CEOs that we classify as 
excessively overconfident are less likely to be terminated than CEOs that we classify as 
moderately overconfident. Thus, our tests should also help to sort out confidence-related 
effects from risk aversion effects.  
 We focus on the turnover implications of Goel and Thakor’s model instead of the 
firm value implications because turnovers are clean, binary-type events that should allow 
more powerful tests of the model. Once investors in a firm become aware that its CEO 
has a suboptimal confidence level, firm value should be a weighted average of the 
suboptimal valuation that the current CEO would generate and the greater valuation that 
a new CEO would generate, appropriately weighted by expectations of the turnover 
probability. It is difficult for a researcher to know when investors realize the suboptimal 
confidence level and what their expectations of turnover probability are, so testing the 
firm value implications of the theory presents empirical difficulties that are not 
straightforward to resolve.  
2.3 Empirical approach 
2.3.1 Confidence measures  
Measuring CEO diffidence and CEO overconfidence empirically presents some 
difficulty because CEO confidence cannot be observed directly. The extant literature on 
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CEO overconfidence employs a number of measures based on the actions taken by the 
CEO and on the portrayal of the CEO by outsiders. Malmendier and Tate (2005) develop 
measures of a CEO’s overconfidence based on the CEO’s net stock purchases and on her 
stock option holding and exercising decisions, and Malmendier and Tate (2008) develop 
a measure based on the CEO's portrayal in the media. Schrand and Zechman (2007) use 
the investment decisions of the firm or industry (as riskier firms might attract more 
overconfident CEOs) and Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) use the predictions 
made by the executive with regards to the firm's future prospects. As we discuss later, 
our sample construction begins with the ExecuComp population and contains over 9,000 
CEO-year observations. Given the sample size, it is infeasible to hand collect measures 
based on the media's portrayal of the CEO or the predictions made by the CEO.
3
 Thus, 
we base our confidence measures on CEO’s stock option exercise decisions and net 
stock purchases, and on firms’ investment levels. 
2.3.1.1 Confidence measures based on stock option holding / exercise decisions 
 For our first set of confidence measures, we draw upon on the stock option-based 
overconfidence measure from Malmendier and Tate (2005). They define CEOs as 
overconfident if they hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money (i.e., the 
stock price exceeds the exercise price by more than 67%). Their choice of 67% comes 
from calibrating Hall and Murphy’s (2002) model using a detailed dataset on executive 
stock option holdings and exercises. Hall and Murphy’s model recognizes that risk-
                                                 
3
 We do, however, conduct a validation exercise of our measures following the media-based approach by 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) at the end of this section.  
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averse executives typically hold undiversified portfolios and should exercise options 
early if they are rational expected utility maximizers. We do not have the same level of 
detailed data that Malmendier and Tate use, so we cannot perform a similar calibration. 
Thus, we take their 67% moneyness cutoff for the full sample of CEOs as a given to 
indicate overconfident CEOs. We need to identify excessively overconfident CEOs, 
however, so we require that CEOs hold stock options that are more than 100% in the 
money. To the extent that the 67% cutoff identifies overconfident managers, the 100% 
cutoff should identify the set of CEOs who are even more overconfident.
4
  
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), we apply the chosen cutoff across the 
full sample of CEOs. Also following Malmendier and Tate, we require that a CEO 
exhibit the option holding behavior at least twice during the sample period. The 
excessive overconfidence classification is assigned, however, beginning with the first 
time the CEO exhibits the behavior. Results are similar to those reported if we instead 
classify CEOs as excessively overconfident beginning with the second time they exhibit 
the option exercise behavior.  
We compute option moneyness to determine the classifications as follows. The 
data that we use do not have option-grant-specific exercise prices, so we estimate the 
average exercise price of the aggregated options by using Core and Guay’s (2002) 
                                                 
4
 Even if one had detailed data to calibrate a model, distinguishing between overconfident and excessively 
overconfident would still represent a judgment call. To explore the sensitivity of our results to the 100% 
cutoff, we alternatively define three groups of CEOs holding options between: 100% and 150% 
moneyness, 151% and 250% moneyness; and above 250% moneyness. Unreported results show that the 
forced turnover hazards do not differ significantly from each other across these groups, but all three 
groups do have significantly greater forced turnover hazards than moderately overconfident CEOs do at 
the 0.10 level or better. Given that the three categories beyond 100% moneyness cutoff appear to have 
similar forced turnover hazards, we combine them into one measure capturing all CEOs holding options at 
100% or greater moneyness.  
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approximation method. Specifically, we compute the average realizable value per option 
as the total realizable value of the options (i.e., the net value from exercising) divided by 
the number of options. We then estimate the average exercise price of the options as the 
stock price at the fiscal year end minus the per-option realizable value. The average 
percentage moneyness of the options is then the stock price at the fiscal year end divided 
by the average estimated exercise price, minus one. Because we want to identify which 
CEOs hold options that could have been exercised, we include only exercisable options 
in these calculations. 
As a complement to the excessive overconfidence measure, we need a measure 
of excessive managerial diffidence, or low confidence. Based on the logic that 
excessively overconfident CEOs hold options too long (i.e., they let options go too deep 
in the money before exercise), we define an excessively diffident CEO as one who 
exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the money and does not hold other 
exercisable options that are greater than 30% in the money.
5,6
 To compute the percentage 
moneyness of the exercised options, we first divide the value realized from exercising 
stock options by the number of options exercised to compute a per option value realized 
from exercising. The percent moneyness of the exercised option holdings is computed as 
                                                 
5
 The data do not permit us to know when options are at expiration. Almost all executive stock options in 
the United States, however, have original expiration periods of exactly ten years (Murphy, 1999). When 
we include only those CEOs with company tenures less than ten years, who are very unlikely to have 
options expiring, our main results still hold. 
 
6
 In footnote 4, we discuss a sensitivity analysis of the 100% moneyness cutoff for the excessive 
overconfidence measure. We are severely limited in doing a comparable analysis for the 30% moneyness 
cutoff for excessive diffidence because there are so few observations in which a CEO exercises options 
with very low moneyness. For example, using a 15% moneyness cutoff, there are only 51 CEO-firm years 
classified as excessively diffident. Thus, our 30% cutoff identifies CEOs at the lower end of the 
confidence spectrum, while producing a group sufficiently large to be useful in our statistical analyses. 
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per option value realized from exercising divided by the average estimated exercise price 
(which is estimated as discussed above for the excessive overconfidence measure). The 
percent moneyness of the unexercised (but exercisable) option holdings is computed as 
the stock price at the end of the fiscal year divided by the estimated average option 
exercise price of the exercisable options, minus one. As with the excessive 
overconfidence measure, we require that CEOs exhibit the relevant exercise behavior at 
last twice in the sample period and classify them as excessively diffident beginning with 
the first time they do. Results are similar to those reported if we instead classify CEOs as 
excessively diffident beginning only with the second time they exhibit the option 
exercise behavior.  
Given the definitions of excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively 
diffident CEOs, we classify CEOs as moderately overconfident if they hold and/or 
exercise options with moneyness between 30% and 100%. With the three option-based 
definitions, we are unable to classify some CEOs as excessively overconfident, 
excessively diffident, or moderately overconfident. For example, we cannot classify 
CEOs who have all of their options out of the money or have no options at all. On the 
one hand, these CEOs clearly have not held options too long which would allow us to 
classify them as excessively overconfident, but on the other hand they really have not 
had an opportunity to exercise early so that we could classify them as excessively 
diffident. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that they have moderate overconfidence 
because they do not clearly lie between excessive diffidence and excessive 
overconfidence on the measure. Similarly, we cannot classify CEOs who have no 
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options for every year they are in the sample. If a CEO has no options held in a given 
year because she exercised all of them in previous years, however, she retains her 
classification going forward from the year in which she was classifiable. In the analyses 
using the option-based measures of confidence, we omit the unclassified CEOs.  
Before discussing our other confidence measures, we need to address a potential 
issue arising from our use of an adapted version of Malmendier and Tate’s (2005) stock 
option exercise-based overconfidence measure to test Goel and Thakor’s (2008) turnover 
prediction. In Malmendier and Tate, an overconfident CEO overestimates the expected 
payoff (mean) from an investment, whereas in Goel and Thakor an overconfident CEO 
underestimates the variance of the payoff. Malmendier and Tate motivate their stock 
option-based overconfidence measure by noting that a CEO who overestimates the mean 
payoff should hold the option beyond the moneyness level that a rational, risk-averse 
CEO would. Under risk-neutral option valuation, the critical stock price for early 
exercise of an American call option increases in stock return volatility (see e.g., Kim, 
1990). Thus, from a risk-neutral standpoint, an option holder who underestimates 
variance would exercise stock options at lower stock prices rather than hold them too 
deep in the money. This risk neutral view would imply that our measure and Malmendier 
and Tate’s measure based on stock options held too deep in the money identify CEOs 
who overestimate variance rather than those who underestimate variance, and thus are 
underconfident in the variance sense. Conversely, our measure based on stock option 
exercises at below 30% moneyness would identify CEOs who underestimate variance 
and thus would be overconfident (in the variance sense) rather than diffident as we use 
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the measure. In short, from a risk-neutral standpoint, our stock-option based measures 
would capture the opposite of what we want.  
The effect of variance on the critical stock price for early exercise differs, 
however, when considering a risk-averse manager who is undiversified and is prohibited 
from hedging a stock option’s payoff risk. Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2009a) 
show theoretically that volatility has a non-monotonic effect on the critical stock price 
for early exercise for such managers, in contrast to what risk-neutral valuation implies. 
The critical stock price rises or falls with volatility depending on a number of manager 
characteristics that we cannot observe. Fortunately, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) 
and Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2009b) provide empirical evidence on the 
question, finding that managers of firms with higher observed stock return volatility 
exercise stock options earlier, which is opposite of what risk neutral valuation predicts. 
If observed stock return volatility is a reasonable proxy in the cross section for a CEO’s 
own estimate of volatility, the results imply that CEOs with lower estimates of volatility 
exercise stock options later. To the extent that later exercise corresponds to exercise at 
higher stock prices, we can infer that CEOs who hold stock options to high levels of 
moneyness are those who underestimate variance and thus, are overconfident in the 
variance sense. The opposite inference should be true for CEOs who exercise stock 
options at low levels of moneyness. Thus, the stock option-based measures should 
identify CEO confidence levels whether one views overconfidence as overestimating the 
mean or underestimating the variance. Further, Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, 
Rutherford, and Stanley (2010) show theoretically that both over confidence in a mean 
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and in a variance sense have similar implications for a risk-averse CEO’s investment 
decisions. CEOs who are diffident will underinvest, but the level of investment will 
increase with the CEO’s overconfidence, leading moderately overconfident CEOs to 
invest optimally while excessively overconfident CEOs overinvest. To the extent that 
our measure proxies for both overconfidence in means and variance, each of these is 
consistent with theoretical predictions. It is also worth emphasizing that the other 
measures of confidence that we use are not subject to the same criticism.
7
 In particular, 
the investment-based measure that we discuss later is motivated by Ben-David, Graham, 
and Harvey (2007), who classify executives as overconfident when they underestimate 
variance.  
We address one additional issue before moving to our alternative measures. The 
ExecuComp data that we use are not as detailed as the proprietary stock option holding 
and exercise data that Malmendier and Tate (2005) use. Thus, an interesting question is 
whether one can use data aggregated across grants within a given year (as provided by 
ExecuComp for our sample period) to achieve similar classifications. We conduct two 
validation analyses to shed light on this question.
8
 First, we examine whether 
Malmendier and Tate’s (2005) main results hold using our algorithm and ExecuComp 
data to identify overconfident managers. With minor substitutions for the governance 
                                                 
7
 It is also worth emphasizing that Goel and Thakor (2008, footnote 10) note that although they model 
overconfidence based on variance, the overconfident manager will also be too optimistic (i.e., 
overestimate the mean). Thus, even if the stock option exercise-based measures only capture a CEO’s 
propensity to misestimate the mean, they should still be useful in testing the turnover prediction from Goel 
and Thakor because their model embeds both optimism and overconfidence. 
 
8 We thank Geoff Tate for suggesting these validation exercises. 
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control variables due to data availability, untabulated results confirm Malmendier and 
Tate’s finding that firms with overconfident managers have significantly greater 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. The coefficient on cash flow has p-values of 0.07 and 
0.03 when replicating their regressions (6) and (7), respectively, of their Table V.  
For the second validation analysis, we draw upon Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) 
media-based measure. We randomly choose 30 CEOs that we classify as excessively 
diffident and 30 that we classify as excessively overconfident using ExecuComp data 
and our algorithm. For these random samples, we search Lexis-Nexis for a three-year 
window centered on the first year that we classify the CEO as excessively diffident or 
excessively overconfident. In any given year, a single major event such as a merger, 
asset sale, or change of management structure may significantly impact search results. 
Thus, we use a three-year period to provide a more balanced count of keywords that 
indicate overconfidence or diffidence. For each CEO, we count (1) the total number of 
articles that mention the CEO; (2) the number of articles containing the words 
"confident," "confidence," "optimism," or "optimistic"; and (3) the number of articles 
that contain the words "reliable", "cautious", "conservative", "practical", "frugal", or 
"steady." We verify that the keywords either describe the CEO or are used in direct 
quotes by the CEO, and reclassify cases in which the keywords are negated by the 
context. We then estimate logistic regressions to test the relation between our 
classifications and the media-based classifications. In untabulated logistic regression 
results, the probability that we classify a CEO as excessively diffident (versus 
excessively overconfident) using our algorithm and ExecuComp data is significantly 
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positively related to the total number of times diffident-type keywords are used by or 
about a CEO, controlling for the total number of media mentions. Furthermore, a 
dummy variable equal to one for CEOs for whom the total number of diffident-type 
keywords exceeds the total number of confident-type keywords yields similar results; the 
coefficient on this dummy variable implies an odds ratio of 3.7. Thus, a CEO 
characterized more often as diffident than overconfident in the media is 3.7 times likely 
to be classified as excessively diffident than excessively overconfident using our option-
exercise / holding measure and ExecuComp data. In sum, the two validation analyses 
suggest that one can produce empirically useful measures of CEO confidence using 
ExecuComp data along with our algorithm.  
2.3.1.2 Confidence measures based on net stock purchases 
For additional confidence measures, we draw upon Malmendier and Tate’s 
(2005) overconfidence measure based on a CEO’s net purchases of shares of stock. Net 
stock purchases equal purchases minus sales, both in units of shares. Malmendier and 
Tate define a CEO as overconfident if the net purchases measure is positive over the first 
five years of their sample period.
9
 Given that we need to identify excessively 
overconfident CEOs, we modify their measure. We classify CEOs as excessively 
overconfident if in a given year their net purchases are in the top quintile of the 
distribution of net purchases by all CEOs and those purchases increase their ownership 
by at least 10% of their stock ownership in the firm. By requiring the two conditions, 
                                                 
9
 We study CEO turnover, which may be related to CEO power obtained over years, so we do not impose 
a minimum years–in–sample requirement that would classify CEOs based on their first five sample years 
of net stock purchases. Using logic similar to Malmendier and Tate, however, we exclude the year of the 
high net stock purchase that causes the classification of a CEO as excessively overconfident and repeat our 
analysis. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported.  
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CEOs are classified as being excessively overconfident only if the amount of the net 
purchase is large in absolute terms, and if the CEO has substantially increased her 
ownership of the firm. All net purchase values in the top quintile are positive, which 
indicates that the CEO has purchased relatively large amounts of stock.  
Likewise, we define CEOs as excessively diffident if their net stock purchases 
place them in the bottom quintile of the distribution of net stock purchases by all CEOs 
and they reduce their stock ownership in the firm by 10% or more in a given year. All 
net stock purchase values in the bottom quintile are negative, which indicates that the 
CEOs’ stock sales exceed their purchases. Thus, a CEO is classified as excessively 
diffident only if the amount of the net sales is large in absolute terms, and if the CEO has 
substantially reduced her ownership of the firm. This should help avoid classifying 
CEOs who have other reasons for selling stock, such as personal liquidity needs, as 
excessively diffident. To the extent that liquidity-motivated sales introduce measurement 
error, this should create a bias against finding a positive effect of diffidence on forced 
turnover.  
CEOs who are not classified as excessively diffident or excessively 
overconfident based on the net stock purchase measure are classified as moderately 
overconfident. In contrast to the stock option-based confidence measures, the net stock 
purchase-based measures allow us to classify all CEOs who have the requisite stock 
transactions data in Thomson Financial Insider Transactions database.  
  Some stock purchases and stock sales are related to stock option exercises. In 
constructing an indicator of CEO confidence, there are potential advantages and 
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disadvantages to including such transactions. Rather than trying to resolve whether 
inclusion or exclusion of such purchases and sales is best, we construct separate 
measures including and excluding the option related transactions, and use both in the 
analyses. The Thomson Financial Insider Transactions database includes a field 
indicating whether a stock purchase or sale transaction is related to stock options.  
 One potential criticism of an overconfidence measure based on net stock 
purchases is that the stock sale decisions may be driven by the CEO’s personal tax 
considerations. Indeed, Jin and Kothari (2008) find that the tax burden associated with a 
CEO’s stock holdings is an important determinant of her stock sales. The danger is that a 
poorly performing CEO should, ceteris paribus, have a low tax burden and be more 
likely to sell stock as a consequence. If the sales are sufficiently large in relative and 
absolute magnitudes, the net stock purchase-based measures of confidence could classify 
such a CEO as excessively diffident. If the poor performance increases the likelihood of 
forced turnover, then our indicator of excessive diffidence could just reflect the effects 
of poor performance. As we discuss later, we include as a control variable the stock 
returns over the CEO’s tenure, which should absorb any variation in stock performance 
effects that might cause forced turnover.  
 Another potential criticism of classifying CEOs based on their decisions about 
stock option exercises and net stock purchases is that these decisions may reflect inside 
information that the CEO has about future firm performance. Later in the section, we lay 
out this criticism more specifically and examine its importance in explaining our results. 
As a preview, we note here that the main results are robust to controlling for stock 
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returns following the stock sales or purchases that result in classification, which are the 
returns that should reflect any inside information a CEO might have had. 
A third potential criticism of the measures relates to the (non)optimality of CEO 
incentives. The two sets of confidence measures described above rely on CEO stock and 
stock options, which are components of CEO compensation. Relying on measures 
related to CEO compensation introduces the risk that the measures actually identify 
CEOs with suboptimal incentive levels and structure instead of CEOs with different 
levels of confidence. For example, suppose that a rational CEO sells large amounts of 
her stockholdings, and that some friction prevents the board from restoring the incentive 
levels to the optimum. The weakened incentive levels may lead the CEO to make 
suboptimal investment decisions that ultimately result in termination. Our net stock 
purchase-based measure would identify that CEO as excessively diffident and attribute 
the forced turnover to diffidence, when in fact it stemmed from suboptimal incentives. 
We next discuss an additional set of confidence measures that are not based on 
components of CEO compensation. 
2.3.1.3 Confidence measures based on firm investment levels 
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) use detailed survey-response data to 
classify chief financial officers (CFO) as overconfident or not. They find that 
overconfident CFOs invest more, which is consistent with theoretical predictions in 
Hackbarth (2008) and Gervais, et al. (2008). To the extent that these overconfident 
CFOs likely have overconfident CEOs who agree to go along with the investment 
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decisions, we can use investment as an instrument for CEO confidence.
10
 We classify 
CEOs as excessively diffident (overconfident) if their firm is in the bottom (top) quintile 
of firms sorted on industry-adjusted investment rates for two consecutive years. We 
impose the two-year requirement because investment is lumpy through time, and we do 
not want to identify firms that just happen to bunch investment in one year. However, 
results are robust to relaxing the two consecutive year requirement and defining this 
measure based on a single year of industry-adjusted investment. Following Malmendier 
and Tate (2005), we define the investment rate as capital expenditures divided by 
beginning of year property, plant, and equipment. We note that the investment-based 
confidence measure is also consistent with Goel and Thakor’s (2008) model in which 
excessively diffident (overconfident) CEOs underinvest (overinvest), assuming that the 
industry median is a reasonable proxy for the optimal level of investment.  
2.3.1.4 Semi-permanence of the confidence measures 
We apply the CEO confidence classifications to each CEO each year they are in 
the sample. If a CEO is classified as excessively overconfident (diffident) in a particular 
year, the CEO retains this classification going forward unless she exhibits excessive 
diffidence (overconfidence) according to the measures. For example, a CEO who holds 
stock options with greater than 100% moneyness in a given year remains classified as 
excessively overconfident going forward unless she exercises stock options in the future 
at less than 30% moneyness, i.e., unless she meets our definition of excessively diffident 
                                                 
10
 Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) also find that overconfident CFOs use lower discount rates, 
choose higher leverage levels and longer debt maturity, and are less likely to pay dividends and more 
likely to repurchase shares. In contrast to investment levels, all of these other decisions are more purely 
financial in nature, so while it is straightforward to argue that they indicate CFO overconfidence, it is more 
difficult to argue that they might also indicate CEO overconfidence.  
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at some future date. Thus, the measures constitute semi-permanent measures of 
excessive overconfidence or excessive diffidence, in which the CEO is reclassified only 
if she exhibits characteristics of a CEO with the opposite behavioral trait.  
One can argue that the CEO decisions or actions underlying our confidence 
measures are endogenously related to the likelihood of their termination or to some other 
factor that also affects termination. Malmendier and Tate (2005) address this potential 
problem by basing the overconfidence classification on CEO decisions or actions made 
before the investment decisions that they study. The analog in our study is to omit years 
in which a CEO is first classified in a particular way. When we do so, the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported. Thus, the results are not driven by an endogeneity 
problem stemming from simultaneous classification and turnover or nonturnover.  
2.3.2 Sample 
To generate the sample, we first collect all CEOs from 1992 through 2003 in 
Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database. We then use news reports collected from 
searching Lexis-Nexis to ascertain whether each CEO: (1) has maintained office (no 
turnover event); (2) has left office voluntarily; or (3) has been forced from office. 
Following Parrino (1997), we classify a turnover as forced if it is explicitly stated as 
forced; or if the CEO was under 60 years old at the time of turnover and (1) the turnover 
was not announced at least six months in advance, or (2) the CEO did not leave for 
health reasons or to take a position at another firm.
11
  
                                                 
11
 It is possible that some CEOs who are forced out are able to secure positions quickly at other firms. This 
could occur when the hiring firms are unaware that the CEO was forced out of her prior position. This 
could also occur when the hiring firms are aware of the forced turnover, but choose to hire the CEO 
anyway because she fits their firm better or because of social or other connections between the CEO and 
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To compute the excessive overconfidence and excessive diffidence indicators, 
we require option grant data from ExecuComp, stock purchases and sales data from 
Thomson Financial's Insider Transactions database, and capital expenditures and net 
property, plant, and equipment from Compustat. As control variables, we include CEO 
age, tenure, and cash compensation (salary and bonus separately), all collected from 
ExecuComp. We also include the annualized industry-adjusted stock return over the 
lesser of the CEO’s tenure or five years, defined as the firm’s stock return minus the 
corresponding median return computed from firms in the same three-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Untabulated results are similar to those reported 
when we use separate covariates for each year of stock returns in the five-year window. 
Untabulated results using raw stock returns are also similar to those reported, as are 
results using firm returns that are decomposed into firm-specific and industry 
components as in Jenter and Kanaan (2008). All stock return data are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Excluding CEO-year combinations with 
missing data for any of the above measures yields a sample of 9,063 total CEO-year 
observations across 2,619 CEO-firm combinations. Of the 2,619 CEOs, 238 are subject 
to a forced turnover at some point.  
                                                                                                                                                
agents at the hiring firm. In any of these cases, the Parrino (1997) classification scheme misclassifies these 
forced turnovers as voluntary because the CEOs have secured other positions. There are 38 turnovers in 
our sample in which the CEO subsequently finds another position, so at most 38 forced turnovers are 
misclassified as voluntary. If the problem is significant, it should blur distinctions between forced and 
voluntary turnovers in our analysis and make it more difficult to find any differences. In results reported 
later in Table B5, we find that the confidence variables and various control variables reliably distinguish 
between forced and voluntary turnovers (while excluding nonturnovers from the analysis). These results 
suggest that any misclassification problems are likely to be relatively minor. 
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2.3.3 Proportional hazard model 
Given the nature of the data and our analysis, we employ the Cox semiparametric 
proportional hazard model to estimate the relation between the likelihood of forced 
turnover and CEO confidence, while controlling for other known determinants of 
turnover. This model has advantages over logistic and multinomial logistic models that 
are commonly used in studies of CEO turnover. First, a hazard model like the Cox model 
explicitly incorporates the fact that a CEO can be at risk of forced turnover in a given 
year and yet not be turned over in that year. The hazard function provides the probability 
of forced turnover in a particular year conditional on the fact that the CEO has survived 
up to that point, which is precisely what we want to know in a study of forced turnover. 
Second, the Cox model uses the time series of information of a CEO in estimating the 
hazard of forced turnover that she faces. Third, the Cox proportional hazard model is 
semiparametric and makes no assumption about the particular shape or nature of the 
survival distribution, which contrasts with parametric models. Shumway (2001) provides 
an excellent discussion of the advantages of hazard models over static models like 
logistic models, including a demonstration that estimates from static models can be 
inconsistent.  
The Cox proportional hazard model assumes proportionality, which simply 
means that the ratio of the hazard functions for two different observations with different 
values of the covariates does not depend on time—instead, the ratio is proportional 
based on the covariates. When this assumption does not hold, one can allow the effects 
of the covariates to be time dependent. We test the proportionality assumption, and in 
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cases where it is violated, we change the specification to allow the effects of the 
covariates to be time dependent.  
While hazard models have become common in the recent literature on financial 
distress (Shumway, 2001; Chava and Purnanandam, 2007), these models have not been 
used widely in the literature on CEO turnover. Given the estimator consistency issue we 
discuss above, we present results for the Cox proportional hazard model. In an 
untabulated analysis, however, instead of using the semiparametric Cox proportional 
hazard model, we estimate (parametric) logistic regressions. We first use only one 
observation per CEO to address the statistical dependence issue that arises in the panel 
data we use. We also estimate logistic regressions with multiple years per CEO and 
include year fixed effects and cluster errors at the CEO level. The main results for either 
estimation of the logistic models are qualitatively similar to those reported for the Cox 
proportional hazard model. As shown in the next subsection, the main results also hold 
in nonparametric univariate analyses.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 CEO confidence and forced turnover 
 Table B1 presents summary statistics for the confidence measures and for the 
control variables we use. Panel A of Table B1 contains results where the unit of 
observation is a CEO (a CEO’s values are averaged across her years in the sample), and 
Panel B contains results where the unit of observation is a CEO-year. Because each 
confidence level indicator is a zero-one dummy variable, its mean represents the 
proportion of the CEOs that are classified in the respective way. As shown in Panel A, 
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using the stock option-based measures, we classify approximately 11% of the CEOs as 
excessively diffident and 39% CEOs as excessively overconfident. By implication, our 
measures classify approximately 50% of CEOs as moderately overconfident. Although 
the unevenness of these proportions stems directly from our chosen 30% and 100% 
moneyness cutoffs, there is no obvious reason to expect the proportions to be equal 
across the groups. One of Goel and Thakor’s (2008) main theoretical results is that the 
tournament process in firms that produces the potential CEO labor pool yields hired 
CEOs who are on average overconfident. Our scheme that classifies substantially more 
CEOs as excessively or moderately overconfident than excessively diffident is consistent 
with this prediction of Goel and Thakor’s model.  
 As shown in Panel A of Table B1, the net stock purchase-based measures 
(excluding option-related transactions) classify 36% of CEOs as excessively diffident 
and 22% of CEOs as excessively overconfident; the respective figures are 37% and 26% 
for the net stock purchase based measures including option-related transactions. Despite 
the fact that we use upper and lower quintile cutoffs to define excessive overconfidence 
and excessive diffidence, respectively, the resulting sample proportions should not 
necessarily equal 20% each. This is because the quintile breakpoints are computed using 
CEO-year observations each year and once a CEO meets the quintile threshold to 
classify them in one group, they remain in that group going forward unless they display 
the opposite behavioral trait.  
 If the asymmetries in the proportions of CEOs classified as excessively diffident 
and excessively overconfident using the above measures are problematic for any reason, 
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we note that the classifications based on investment rates are quite symmetric. As shown 
in Panel A of Table B1, with this measure approximately 17% of CEOs are classified as 
excessively diffident and approximately 18% are classified as excessively overconfident.  
 As shown in Panel B of Table B1, the mean and median annualized industry-
adjusted stock return are both positive. We use the CRSP population to compute the 
respective median industry monthly return that is subtracted from each firm’s monthly 
return before computing the annualized industry-adjusted stock return. Our ExecuComp-
based sample is a subset of CRSP. Thus, the industry-adjusted mean and median should 
not necessarily be expected to be zero. The age, tenure, and cash compensation figures 
are in line with other studies of CEO turnover or CEO characteristics.  
 Before examining the effect of confidence on forced turnover in a regression 
framework that controls for other determinants of turnover, we perform two univariate 
analyses. First, in Table B2 we show results for simple one-way sorts on the confidence 
measures. Consistent with Goel and Thakor’s (2008) predictions, we find that CEOs 
who are excessively diffident and CEOs who are excessively overconfident face greater 
forced turnover rates than CEOs who are moderately overconfident. For example, using 
figures for the stock option-based confidence measures, 3.15% of excessively diffident 
CEOs, 0.90% of moderately overconfident CEOs, and 2.12% of excessively 
overconfident CEOs are subject to forced turnover. The pattern of results is similar 
based on the other three sets of confidence indicators. In all cases, the moderately 
overconfident CEOs have the lowest forced turnover rates. Thus, the effects of CEO 
confidence on forced turnover are evident even in a univariate analysis.  
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 Next, we examine the Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard for 
CEOs in the three groups of confidence levels. This nonparametric analysis 
complements the analysis in Table B2 by illustrating the hazard rates cumulated over 
time for each group of CEOs. As shown in Figure A1, as time passes, excessively 
diffident CEOs face the greatest cumulative hazard of forced turnover of the three 
groups, followed by excessively overconfident CEOs, and then by moderately 
overconfident CEOs, who face the lowest cumulative hazard. Both the log-rank test and 
the Tarone-Ware (1977) test imply rejection of the null hypothesis of equal hazard 
functions across the CEO confidence groups at the 0.01 level. Thus, as time passes 
CEOs in the three confidence groups face significantly different hazards of forced 
turnover.  
We next move to the Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the 
relation between CEO forced turnover and CEO confidence while controlling for other 
determinants of forced turnover. Table B3 presents the results. The dependent variable 
equals one for forced turnovers, and zero otherwise. We employ a dummy variable for 
excessively diffident CEOs and a dummy variable for excessively overconfident CEOs. 
Moderately overconfident CEOs are the omitted group and thus serve as the baseline. 
The coefficients on the excessive diffidence and excessive overconfidence dummy 
variables (appropriately adjusted) indicate the probability of a forced turnover relative to 
the probability faced by a moderately overconfident CEO.
12
 The control variables 
include the annualized industry-adjusted return over the lesser of the CEO’s tenure or 
                                                 
12
 Similar to a logistic regression, one must compute the exponential of the coefficient times the variable 
value, which is 0 or 1 here.  
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five years
13, the percentage of firm equity the CEO owns, and the CEO’s age, tenure, 
and cash salary and bonus figures. Each column presents results based on a different 
classification scheme for CEO confidence level.  
As shown in Table B3, regardless of the measure underlying the confidence 
classifications, we find that excessively diffident CEOs and excessively overconfident 
CEOs face significantly greater turnover hazards than moderately overconfident CEOs. 
All confidence coefficients are significant with p-values of 0.02 or smaller. Depending 
on the measure, the coefficients imply that an excessively diffident CEO faces a 64% to 
139% greater probability of forced turnover than a moderately overconfident CEO does, 
with an average of 97% greater. The range of probabilities for excessively overconfident 
CEOs is 57% to 103% greater than moderately overconfident CEOs, with an average of 
67% greater. These effects are large economically.  
To put the magnitude of the effects of confidence on forced turnover in 
perspective, we compare them to the effect of a CEO generating a poor industry-adjusted 
stock return. Specifically, we compute the relative probability (compared to the baseline 
probability) of a CEO generating an industry-adjusted stock return that is two standard 
deviations below the mean. Depending on the regression in Table B3, such a CEO faces 
a 44% to 74% greater probability of forced turnover than a mean-performing CEO, with 
an average of 65%. Thus, on average the effect on the likelihood of forced turnover of 
                                                 
13
 Our main results also hold when we include the five years of returns individually as separate covariates 
in the regression. Additionally, we discuss an alternate measure of returns, which is calculated over the 
lesser of the time since the CEO was classified as excessively diffident (overconfident) or five years, in 
Section 4.2 below. 
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excessive diffidence or excessive overconfidence is comparable to the effect of stock 
return performance two standard deviations below the mean.  
Although Goel and Thakor (2008) make no specific predictions about the relative 
magnitudes of turnover hazard across excessively diffident and excessively 
overconfident CEOs, another interesting result emerges from the results: the coefficients 
on the excessive overconfidence indicator and the excessive diffidence indicator do not 
differ significantly from each other in any regression. Thus, CEOs who are classified at 
opposite ends of the confidence spectrum do not face statistically different likelihoods of 
being subject to forced turnover, and both face significantly higher risk than a 
moderately overconfident CEO faces. These results provide indirect support for the view 
that there is an interior optimum level of overconfidence that maximizes firm value.  
Among the control variables, industry-adjusted stock return, percent ownership, 
salary, bonus, age, and tenure are significant in most regressions and have the expected 
signs.  
In subsection 2.2, we note that the predictions in Goel and Thakor (2008) that 
link forced turnover of CEOs to their confidence levels presume strong board 
governance, i.e., that the board acts in the best interests of shareholders. More 
specifically, the board of directors must have sufficient motivation and ability to 
terminate a CEO who exhibits excessive diffidence or excessive overconfidence. A 
board with weak governance may lack the incentive or ability to terminate CEOs with 
suboptimal levels of confidence even when that confidence reduces shareholder wealth. 
Thus, we next examine the relation between forced turnover and confidence levels for 
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firms with weak and strong board governance separately. We define firms with weak 
board governance as those that jointly have a majority of insiders, have the CEO as 
Chairman of the board, and are classified; other firms are defined as having strong board 
governance. The data for these variables come from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center, Inc. database.  
The results of the analysis split by board governance are in Table B4. The first 
four columns of figures in Table B4 show that among firms with strong board 
governance, excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs are significantly 
more likely to face forced termination than moderately overconfident CEOs. In contrast, 
the last four columns of Table B4 show that among firms with weak boards there is no 
reliable relation between forced turnover and CEO confidence levels. Results for the 
confidence measures based on firms’ investment levels imply that excessively diffident 
CEOs face a greater turnover hazard even at firms with weak boards, but this relation is 
not significant at conventional levels for the other sets of confidence measures. Thus, our 
overall results are driven by firms with strong board governance, which is expected 
given that we study CEO forced turnovers.  
2.4.2 Alternative explanations 
Our results thus far show that CEOs that we classify as excessively overconfident 
and CEOs that we classify as excessively diffident face significantly greater forced 
turnover hazards than do CEOs that we classify as moderately overconfident. It is 
possible that our measures capture some other feature of CEOs or CEO performance that 
relate to turnovers in general rather than forced turnovers. For example, given that most 
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executive stock options are granted at the money, CEOs with options deep in the money 
(greater than 100%) are likely those whose firms have experienced raw stock returns of 
at least 100%. If this is considered exceptional performance, then the external labor 
market may attract these CEOs away to better opportunities. Such turnovers are 
voluntary, but if a significant fraction of them are misclassified as forced, then our 
results for excessively overconfident CEOs could be wrong.  
Another possibility relates to the CEOs who are excessively diffident. CEOs with 
very low confidence may reach a point at which they believe they cannot add value to 
their firm and consequently choose to leave their firms voluntarily. As with excessively 
overconfident CEOs, such turnovers are voluntary, but if a significant fraction of them 
are misclassified as forced, then our results for excessively diffident CEOs could also be 
wrong.  
In both of the alternative explanations we discuss above, the dummy variables for 
excessive CEO overconfidence and excessive CEO diffidence pick up in part the effects 
of voluntary turnovers and thus do not directly support Goel and Thakor’s (2008) 
predictions about forced turnover and CEO confidence. To rule out this possibility, we 
conduct two additional tests. First, we exclude all nonturnover observations from the 
regressions, so that we compare only forced turnovers to voluntary turnovers. If 
turnovers of CEOs with excessive overconfidence are mostly voluntary, with some 
misclassifications as forced turnovers, the CEO excessive overconfidence indicator 
should have no ability to distinguish between voluntary and forced turnovers. A similar 
argument applies for the turnovers of CEOs with excessive diffidence.  
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Table B5 contains results for Cox proportional hazard regressions estimated over 
the subsample of forced and voluntary turnovers. In these regressions, the dependent 
variable equals one for forced turnovers, and zero for voluntary turnovers. This analysis 
excludes all nonturnover CEO-years. There are 672 observations for the confidence 
measures based on stock option holdings, and 1,242 observations for confidence 
measures based on the other schemes. With only two exceptions, the indicator variables 
for excessively overconfident CEOs and for excessively diffident CEOs are significantly 
positive with p-values less than 0.05. The two exceptions are the excessive 
overconfidence dummy variable based on net stock purchases including option-related 
transactions (p-value = 0.14) and the excessive overconfidence dummy variable based 
on investment rates (p-value = 0.08). Overall, the confidence measures appear to 
distinguish statistically between forced and voluntary turnovers. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients imply that the relative probabilities of forced turnover 
(versus voluntary turnover) for excessively diffident CEOs and excessively 
overconfident CEOs are large economically. The results imply that the measures do not 
simply capture a turnover effect per se.  
Our second approach to distinguish between general turnover versus forced 
turnover effects is to exclude all forced turnover observations, so that we compare only 
voluntary turnovers to nonturnovers. In these regressions, the dependent variable equals 
one for voluntary turnover, and zero otherwise. The results of these regressions are in 
Table B6. In no case do we find that excessively overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
turn over voluntarily than CEOs with moderate overconfidence. The coefficients on the 
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excessively diffident CEO indicator variable based on stock options or based on net 
stock purchases including option-related transactions are positive, but the effects are 
weak statistically (p-values of 0.10 and 0.07 respectively) and small economically. The 
coefficient on the excessively diffident CEO indicator based on net stock purchases 
excluding option related transactions is close to zero in magnitude with a p-value of 
0.69, and the corresponding coefficient based on investment rates is actually negative in 
sign (p-value of 0.20). In short, there is no consistent evidence that the confidence 
indicator variables predict voluntary turnover. 
Collectively, these two tests imply that the measures of excessive CEO 
overconfidence and excessive CEO diffidence are related specifically to forced 
turnovers, and not to turnovers in general. The results support Goel and Thakor’s (2008) 
prediction that turnovers of such CEOs are forced, and indirectly are consistent with 
predictions from other theoretical models that such CEOs create less value than CEOs 
with moderate overconfidence.  
Another potential explanation is that the indicators of excessive CEO 
overconfidence and excessive CEO diffidence do not capture CEO confidence, but 
rather CEO risk aversion levels. CEOs that we classify as excessively overconfident 
because they hold options deep in the money or purchase large amounts of their firm’s 
stock may actually be rational agents with little or no risk aversion. CEOs that we 
classify as excessively diffident because they exercise options too early or liquidate their 
undiversified holdings of company stock may actually be rational agents with high levels 
of risk aversion. CEOs that we classify as moderately overconfident may just be rational 
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agents with moderate levels of risk aversion. Goel and Thakor (2008), however, 
emphasize that firm value increases monotonically as risk aversion falls because less 
risk-averse CEOs would accept profitable but risky projects that more risk-averse CEOs 
would reject. If forced turnover rates are lower for CEOs who maximize firm value and 
if our confidence measures just capture risk aversion effects, then we should find that the 
likelihood of forced turnover falls monotonically with the measured CEO 
overconfidence. Although our finding that excessively diffident CEOs face a greater 
turnover hazard than moderately overconfident CEOs is consistent with this alternative, 
the finding that CEOs classified as excessively overconfident face greater turnover 
hazards than CEOs that we classify as moderately overconfident is the opposite of what 
the alternative explanation predicts. Thus, the overconfidence measures likely do not just 
capture CEO risk aversion effects. This conclusion is too strong if one believes that the 
CEOs that we classify as excessively overconfident are actually risk seeking rather than 
risk neutral. We do not see a convincing way to examine this possibility empirically. 
Another possible explanation is that the confidence indicators just reflect the 
effects of CEO inside information. Specifically, CEOs that we classify as excessively 
diffident because they exercise options at low moneyness or because they sell large 
amounts of their stock holdings may just possess inside information about future 
negative outcomes that would reduce firm value and increase the likelihood of forced 
turnover. Conversely, CEOs that we classify as excessively overconfident because they 
hold options deep in the money or increase their stockholding significantly may just 
possess inside information about future positive outcomes that would increase firm 
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value. As with the risk aversion explanation, if our measures just capture the effects of 
CEO inside information, we should find that the likelihood of termination falls 
monotonically in presumed confidence, which is not what we find. Thus, it is unlikely 
that our confidence measures just capture the effects of inside information.  
An alternate version of this explanation is that CEOs that we classify as 
excessively diffident and excessively overconfident both have negative inside 
information about the firm and due to the expectation of poor firm performance are more 
likely to be fired. This could be the case if the CEOs that we classify as excessively 
overconfident have negative information but are restricted from exercising options, thus 
causing them to hold their options too deep in the money. Before discussing the analysis 
of this potential problem, we emphasize that all of our results hold when we use the 
investment-based measure of confidence, which is not subject to this criticism. We also 
note that any restrictions on exercising options would have to be those beyond formal 
vesting restrictions on options because (as we discuss in subsection 2.3) we use only 
exercisable options in classifying a CEO as excessively overconfident.  
If either of the above explanations based on inside information explain our 
results, we should find that the importance of the confidence classifications falls or 
vanishes once we control for stock returns following the point at which a CEO is 
classified because those are the stock returns that would reflect the inside information. 
Thus, we adjust our return control variable in the regressions to account for the 
possibility of inside information. For CEOs that are classified as excessively diffident or 
excessively overconfident, we calculate annualized industry-adjusted returns for the 
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lesser of three years or the time since the CEO was classified. Three years is the mean 
time between classification and forced turnover for CEOs in our sample. For all other 
CEOs, the return variable is calculated over the lesser of three years or the CEO’s tenure. 
For the CEOs that we classify as excessively diffident or excessively overconfident, this 
return measure focuses on the period following their classification if it was relatively 
recent (within the past three years) and should capture any effect of CEOs being 
terminated due to poor performance consistent with an inside information story. The 
untabulated regression results from this analysis, however, are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar to those reported. Similar results hold when we use raw returns in 
place of the industry-adjusted returns. These results are inconsistent with an inside 
information-based explanation of the relation between forced turnover and our 
confidence classifications. 
2.5 Discussion  
 We find that excessively diffident CEOs and excessively overconfident CEOs 
face significantly greater hazards of forced turnover than moderately overconfident 
CEOs face. We control for firm stock return performance, and CEO age, tenure, salary, 
bonus, and stock ownership, so the effects of confidence that we document suggest an 
important new determinant of CEO turnover that is distinct from these CEO 
characteristics, compensation, and performance. The results are consistent with direct 
theoretical predictions by Goel and Thakor (2008). The results point to the importance of 
considering the whole range of CEO confidence levels in theoretical and empirical 
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analyses, and are broadly consistent with the view that CEOs with moderate levels of 
overconfidence maximize firm value (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Hackbarth, 2008).  
 In addition to providing evidence about recent theoretical models, we contribute 
to the empirical literature on CEO overconfidence by adapting and refining previously 
employed measures of overconfidence to also indicate excessive diffidence, or low 
confidence. Now that theoretical models have begun examining whether there are 
interior optimum levels of overconfidence, our measures of excessive diffidence should 
prove useful in future empirical research on CEO confidence. We also contribute to the 
empirical literature by validating the construction of the Malmendier-Tate option-holder 
confidence measure using stock option data in ExecuComp instead of the proprietary 
data they use. This validation should prove useful to researchers who want to study 
confidence effects among executives in the ExecuComp database, which contains a 
greater number of executives over a longer time period than do most proprietary 
datasets. 
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3. OPTIMAL DEBT COMPENSATION AND THE VALUE OF EQUITY 
 
3.1 Introduction to Section 3 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) theorize that debt-like compensation will impact the 
incentives for the CEO to reduce firm risk and maximize the value of the CEO's debt 
claim. In particular, when the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio exceeds the firm's, the CEO 
will have the incentive to risk shift, and lower the firm's risk in order to maximize the 
value of debt. This will negatively impact equity holders if the CEO foregoes positive 
NPV projects in order to reduce risk, in effect shifting value away from equity holders 
who would prefer the CEO invest in projects with the highest expected payoffs, 
regardless of project risk. If this is the case, higher debt compensation should lead to a 
decreased value of firm equity. Recent empirical work has found evidence consistent 
with this prediction: Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and Yermack (2010) find 
that CEO debt-like compensation is negatively associated with firm risk and equity 
value, but positively related to firm debt value, primarily when the CEO's debt-to-equity 
is higher than the firm's debt-to-equity.  
On the other hand, recent theory considers the potential gains from debt-like 
compensation through a reduction in total agency costs, and suggests that debt 
compensation may not always negatively affect shareholders. Specifically, Edmans 
(2008) theoretically predicts that debt-like compensation could be used as part of an 
optimal compensation package, and it may be optimal for the CEO's debt-to-equity to 
exceed the firm's debt-to-equity in some instances. A consequence is that deviations 
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from optimal debt compensation could lead to increased agency costs of debt. And if 
equity holders bear the debt agency costs, this would lead to decreased equity value as 
well. By limiting the deviation from optimal incentives, the firm can potentially decrease 
total agency costs, and increase the value of equity.  
Adding to this stream of research, Gerakos (2007) studies the use of debt-like 
executive compensation in an attempt to determine whether its use is justified by optimal 
contracting or driven by CEO power. The results provide little support for the view that 
powerful CEOs receive higher pension benefits, but do suggest that pensions can be used 
to extract rents. However, results also suggest that economic variables explain a 
substantial portion of CEO pension benefits. The author concludes that results support 
portions of each possible underlying cause, but that debt-like compensation does appear 
to be driven in part by optimal contracting concerns.  
Taken together, extant literature has only been able to support a rather weak 
conclusion: granting debt-like compensation to managers may be optimal in some 
instances, and harm equity holders in others. Thus, no consensus has been reached in the 
literature, and the empirical question remains: can a non-zero level of CEO debt 
compensation, even a large level, be optimal (based on firm characteristics) for equity 
holders? In other words, are deviations from the optimal level costly to equity holders? 
We address this question using a relatively large sample of CEOs with available data on 
debt-like compensation.  
 We follow Wei and Yermack (2010) in focusing our research on the CEO’s 
relative debt-to-equity, defined as the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm’s 
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debt-to-equity ratio. We begin with a simple empirical model for the optimal level of 
CEO debt-to-equity, where the optimum is the point at which the CEO’s debt-to-equity 
exactly matches the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. This corresponds to the level that Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest would not give the CEO any incentives to risk shift. We 
then extend the analysis to incorporate possible determinants of CEO debt-to-equity that 
could be associated with optimal contracting. Drawing on the empirical results of 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2007), we estimate four models of the 
optimal level of CEO relative debt-to-equity holdings. Our empirical models focus on 
the determinants of CEO debt-to-equity previously found to be relevant in the literature 
that likely represent considerations for optimal contracting.  
For three specifications, we estimate the model for the full set of available firms 
and apply the estimated model to all firms with non-missing data. For our fourth model, 
we consider an alternate specification where the empirical model is estimated using only 
firms with relatively high institutional ownership (as a measure of governance), and 
apply the estimated model to all firms in the full sample. We consider multiple empirical 
models in an effort to insure that our results do not depend on any one particular 
specification. We estimate the optimal level of CEO relative debt-to-equity each year, 
and compare the deviation of the CEO's actual debt-to-equity ratio from the estimated 
optimal level. We then construct a measure of the adjustment in the CEO's holdings 
relative to the optimal level, using the change (from t=0 to t=1) in the absolute value of 
the deviation from optimal holdings. If debt compensation is driven by optimal 
contracting, deviations from the optimal level should be costly, and reductions in the 
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deviation should result in positive stock price reactions. We test this prediction using 
abnormal stock returns around the firm's proxy date, when new CEO compensation data 
is released.  
We conduct our investigation in an event study framework following the 
recommendations of Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1997). Abnormal returns are calculated using a simple market model for the expected 
return, where the value-weighted return from CRSP is employed as the market return. 
We follow Wei and Yermack (2010) and analyze returns over the two-day window at the 
proxy release date, covering the date that the proxy is released and the following day 
(0,+1). If equity holders benefit from the optimal use of debt compensation, abnormal 
returns should be positive when the firm announces that the CEO’s debt compensation 
has approached the optimal level. We use this event return data to test two hypotheses. 
Our first hypothesis is that a decrease (increase) in the deviation from optimal 
CEO relative debt-to-equity will have a positive (negative) impact on abnormal returns 
to firm equity at the firm’s proxy date. In other words, we expect abnormal returns to be 
negatively related to the change in the deviation from optimal CEO holdings, on 
average, for our entire sample of firms. We test this prediction using each of the five 
empirical models for optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity mentioned above. We find 
that, for the full sample of firms, stock prices typically do not react to changes in the 
deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity. In only one case, where the simple 
model is used to determine the optimal level, do we find a significant positive stock 
price reaction in response to a large decrease in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-
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equity. In this case, there is a significant positive abnormal return of 82 basis points (p-
value = 0.01) in response to a large decrease in the deviation, amounting to a 50 basis 
point higher return than firms that did not experience a large decrease (p-value = 0.04). 
In other univariate tests and in regression analyses, there does not appear to be a 
significant reaction to a decrease in the deviation on average for the full sample of firms. 
In our second hypothesis, we consider the possibility that the impact of the 
deviation from optimal CEO holdings will be asymmetric across firms, such that equity 
holders are only adversely affected at firms where maintaining the optimal level is likely 
to be less costly or have the highest benefit. Previous research has suggested that this 
might be the case. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the negative 
effects of debt compensation will be most pronounced when the CEO’s debt-to-equity 
exceeds the firm’s. Wei and Yermack (2010) find results consistent with this prediction. 
It is also possible that the costs associated with decreasing the deviation from the 
optimal level may be asymmetric depending on the direction of the deviation. For 
example, it may be easier and less costly for a firm to give the CEO higher pension 
benefits (which only have a cost to the firm if the CEO retires from that firm) or fail to 
replace expiring or exercised options or stock that the CEO has sold. This may not be the 
case when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity is excessively high. The firm typically 
could find reducing CEO debt compensation to be costly or difficult, because the CEO 
would likely fight to maintain pension benefits, and the firm will likely lack the ability to 
decrease the CEO’s total deferred compensation. Increasing the CEO’s equity holdings 
can also be problematic due to the possible outrage factor associated with large stock 
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and option grants. Further, the firm’s governance in place may impact the agency costs 
of debt, and thus the benefits for reducing these costs through the optimal use of debt 
compensation. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that high institutional ownership helps 
to reduce the agency costs of debt. Optimal debt compensation may be relatively 
important when other mechanisms, such as high institutional ownership, are not in place 
at the firm. Based on this, we hypothesize that abnormal announcement returns to firm 
equity will be negatively related to the change in the deviation from optimal CEO 
relative debt-to-equity primarily when the CEO’s holdings had been below one, below 
the empirically modeled optimal level, or when the firm had relatively low institutional 
holdings. 
In subsets where the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was below one or the firm had 
relatively weak governance (relatively low institutional ownership), we find evidence 
that stock prices do react positively to large decreases in the distance from optimal CEO 
compensation. Within subsamples where the CEO relative debt-to-equity had been lower 
than the optimum, the evidence is mixed. When the simple model is used, the average 
abnormal return to a firm with a large decrease is approximately zero, and not 
significantly different from the mean abnormal return for firms without a large decrease. 
We only find a positive abnormal when the firm had a large decrease in the deviation 
from the more sophisticated model optimum and the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity had 
been below one or the firm had relatively low institutional ownership. In the latter case, 
firms with relatively weak governance earn a 118 basis point abnormal return (p-value = 
0.00) when there is a large decrease in the deviation, which is 66 basis points higher than 
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the return earned by firms without a large decrease (p-value = 0.03). For other groups 
however, no significant positive reaction occurs. The results testing our second 
hypothesis in block-diagonal regressions are similarly mixed: abnormal returns to the 
firm's equity are negatively related to the change in the deviation from the optimal level, 
but only when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity had been below one. Our results do 
suggest that the optimal use of debt compensation can benefit equity holders, but more 
research is needed to determine why the results are inconsistent across models, and do 
not hold for the full sample of firms.  
One concern with our analysis stems from the joint hypothesis nature of our tests. 
In essence, we are jointly testing the hypothesis that optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity 
has a positive impact of equity value, and the hypothesis that our empirical model for the 
optimal level is accurate. A related concern is that our results are driven by large 
variation in the estimates for the underlying optimal level of CEO holdings rather than 
changes in the holdings themselves. This would suggest that our results are due 
primarily to our empirical model rather than the CEO’s actual holdings, which is 
problematic because we do not have an independent test for our underlying models being 
correct.  
We take two steps to address the concern that our results are driven by large 
variation in the underlying empirical models for optimal holdings. First, we drop all 
firms where the predicted optimal level has a large time-series standard deviation. Our 
results are robust to this, even if we drop firms that have higher than median standard 
deviation. To more directly address this, we also perform our analysis using the fitted 
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value at t=0 as the optimal level for both t=0 and t=1, keeping the optimal level fixed, so 
that any variation in our measure of the change in deviation is driven by changes in 
CEO’s actual relative debt-to-equity. Our results are robust to this as well. Thus, it is 
unlikely that our results are driven by changes in the estimated optimal level, but rather 
appear to be driven by changes in the CEO’s actual holdings as they relate to the optimal 
level. 
We contribute to the growing literature on the use of debt-like compensation in 
executive pay packages. Primarily, we provide new evidence consistent with an optimal 
level of debt-like compensation relative to the CEO's equity holdings, and that positive 
or negative deviations from the optimal level can have a negative impact on the value of 
the firm's equity. Our results (weakly) support the theoretical predictions of Edmans 
(2008) that debt-like compensation can be a part of an optimal compensation contract. 
Our research also complements and extends the work of Gerakos (2007) by 
demonstrating that firms correct deviations in the CEO's debt-to-equity holdings from 
the optimal level, potentially to the benefit of shareholders. However, the lack of a 
consistent positive reaction to CEO holdings moving nearer the optimal level suggests 
that further research is needed to determine the cause. Future work should investigate 
whether the relation between CEO holdings and equity value has a non-linear form, or if 
the predictive models for optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity are inadequate (and how 
the models can be improved). If the models are found to be adequate, future research 
would be needed to understand why investors fail to view the CEO’s compensation 
approaching the optimal level as value increasing. 
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3.2 Background and motivation 
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) theoretically developed the agency problem 
for the firm given the separation of ownership and control, a large number of papers 
have focused on executive compensation as a method to reduce agency costs and 
conflicts. For example, Haugen and Senbet (1981) show that stock options granted to 
executives may help to mitigate the agency conflict between equity holders and 
management. However, call options typically issued to management may create the 
incentive to increase the variance of cash flows, and maximize the value of the options. 
This represents an incentive to risk shift, in this case leading the manager to increase 
firm risk. While equity and option compensation can be effective at decreasing the 
agency problem between equity-holders and managers, an important implication is that 
in the absence of an optimal put option contract, an increase in call option compensation 
may also increase the manager's incentive to increase risk. Many studies have added to 
this stream of literature analyzing the impact of equity compensation on various firm 
outcomes. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) show that increased executive equity 
ownership acts to mitigate agency problems between management and equity-holders, 
consistent with the predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976). In addition, the authors 
note that the use of convertible debt, which may have similar effects to put options, is 
not significantly different between firms that take actions to increase and decrease the 
variance of stock returns. Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein (1987) document that long-
term performance plans as a part of executive compensation increase the incentives of 
management to undertake divestitures when these are beneficial to shareholders. 
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Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985) find that investors react positively to the 
introduction of long-term managerial compensation plans, but cannot attribute this solely 
to the effects of agency problems. DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) provide results 
that suggest that the introductions of stock option plans lead to increases in the wealth of 
shareholders, likely at the cost of debt-holders. The authors analyze a relatively small 
sample of bond price reactions, but the results do suggest that bond holders react 
negatively to the announcement. These results imply that increased option compensation 
for executives does impact the agency struggle between debt- and equity-holders. Many 
other papers have documented the impact of various forms of compensation on firm 
value and risk
14
, while a number of studies have examined the relation between 
executive compensation and agency conflicts in a number of alternate settings.
15
 
Although until recently debt-like compensation has not been widely considered 
in the literature as an important component of executive compensation
16
, it may have 
significant implications. Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that the use of this ―inside 
debt‖ could align managers with bondholders, in some cases to the detriment of 
shareholders. In this seminal work, the authors extensively consider the theoretical 
                                                 
14
 For example, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006), DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990), Haugen and Senbet (1981), Mehran (1992), Yermack 
(1995), and many others. For a more comprehensive review of this literature, please see Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006). 
15
 Many studies have analyzed the impact of compensation incentives on agency conflicts in different 
settings, such as Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005), Chava and Purnanandam (2009), and 
Dittman and Yu (2008) for example, and generally find that compensation can impact risk-taking, and thus 
agency conflicts. 
16
 Other work has considered debt-like compensation in other contexts, such as Shivdasani and Stefanescu 
(2008), who consider the impact of defined benefit pension plans on capital structure decisions, but focus 
on the manner in which managers view pension plans as part of the firm's capital structure, rather than 
analyzing the incentives generated by such compensation arrangements. 
51 
 
 
effects of various levels of managerial equity ownership on the extent of agency costs 
and implications for the value of the firm.  
Although the authors do not fully incorporate debt or debt-like compensation into 
their model, possible implications are developed intuitively. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), an increase in the ownership of debt claims should lead to an increase 
in the manager's incentives to maximize the value of these claims, resulting in a shift in 
the alignment of management from the interests of equity holders to the interests of debt 
holders. The authors expect that if, for instance, the debt-to-equity ratio of claims on the 
firm held by a manager exactly equals the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm, the manager 
would have no incentive to shift risk from shareholders to bondholders under their 
model. Analysis of the specific effects of changes in the debt claims held by a manager 
is left for future research. It is straightforward to predict that such changes in debt and 
equity compensation are likely to have an impact on the value the firm, and the claims 
against it. Although this intuitive analysis gives a foundation for testable hypotheses, this 
topic has yet to be thoroughly researched empirically. The focus of many empirical 
studies has been primarily on attempting to determine the impact of types of equity 
compensation on executive decision-making and the agency costs of the firm, while 
leaving the implications of debt-like compensation largely for future research. However, 
important steps have been taken towards understanding the effects of debt-like executive 
compensation by recent work, including Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and 
Yermack (2010). 
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Sundaram and Yermack (2007) provide empirical evidence of the determinants 
of debt-like compensation and its impact on firm risk. Their work takes a number of 
steps to establish a base for future research into the implications of ―inside debt.‖ First, 
the authors develop a measure of debt compensation based on the present value of the 
CEO's pension benefits, which represents a lower bound approximation. Pensions are 
essentially debt contracts whereby management provides labor (at a cost) in order to 
receive payments in the future. Although the bond and other debt holdings of managers 
would also be of interest in this analysis, this data is not widely available for U.S. firms 
at this time. The authors show that many CEOs of large firms possess debt-like claims 
against the firm, the value of which may be large ($84 million in one case). Futhermore, 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document a significant relation between this measure of 
debt compensation and firm-level outcomes. The authors hypothesize that, if debt-like 
compensation aligns the CEO with debt holders who prefer lower risk, the CEO will take 
actions to decrease the risk of the firm. The analysis considers a proxy for the riskiness 
of the firm based on the ―distance-to-default‖, defined as the number of standard 
deviations’ decrease in firm value that would make the firm likely to default on its debt. 
Using a sample of 237 firms, the authors find that higher CEO pension value is 
correlated with higher ―distance-to-default‖ for the corresponding firm. The authors 
interpret this as evidence that CEOs with relatively higher pension benefits manage the 
firm more conservatively. Additionally, the authors document that the structure of 
compensation shifts systematically from equity grants to debt-like compensation as the 
CEO grows older. CEO’s are also found to be more likely to leave the firm via planned 
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turnover when the CEO’s age is near or exceeds the minimum age needed to collect full 
pension benefits.  
 Wei and Yermack (2010) extend this stream of literature further by considering 
the implications of debt-like compensation for the value of the firm's debt and equity, 
and provide additional evidence of a negative relation between debt-like compensation 
and firm risk. The authors perform their tests using the ―relative‖ CEO debt-to-equity, or 
the CEO debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. Results suggest 
that shareholders react negatively and bondholders positively to the initial required 
announcement of CEO debt-like compensation
17
 when the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio 
exceeds that of the firm. These results are generally consistent with the predictions of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 A different theoretical perspective and extension of the literature comes from 
Edmans (2008), who develops a model of managerial compensation that includes the use 
of pensions and other debt-like compensation. The author concludes that the use of 
―inside debt‖ is justified as a part of managerial compensation in a number of situations 
as it may act to reduce agency costs. The model demonstrates that debt-like 
compensation can be used in optimal contracting, and may optimally exceed equity 
holdings in particular cases as it can lead to a reduction in total agency costs. If equity 
holders bear these agency costs, they should benefit from reductions in these costs, and 
the value of equity should increase. A number of the implications of this paper are 
supported by empirical findings. For instance, Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) find 
                                                 
17
 Release of CEO pension value and benefits was required by the SEC beginning in early 2007 (Wei and 
Yermack, 2010). 
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that CEO pension value has a negative impact on the likelihood of having certain bond 
covenants, which could be viewed as consistent with a decrease in the agency costs of 
debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document cases for which CEO pension values 
exceed the value of equity holdings. Gerakos (2007) finds that many of the determinants 
of debt-like compensation are consistent with optimal contracting, as predicted by 
Edmans (2008).  
Gerakos (2007) analyzes the relation between CEO power and pension values in 
an attempt to distinguish between ―Optimal Contracting‖ and ―Managerial Power‖ 
theories of compensation. The results from this work generally do not suggest that 
powerful CEOs demand higher pension benefits, even though pensions can be used to 
extract rents. The author is unable to fully distinguish between these two competing 
theories, as results also suggest that variables consistent with optimal contracting are 
significant drivers of CEO pension benefits. An additional result is that the bias between 
reported and actual pension benefits is not large. While results support portions of each 
theory, the author concludes that debt-like compensation is driven in part by optimal 
contracting.  
 To summarize, theoretical and empirical results suggest that the use of equity as 
a form of compensation for top executives can help to align these agents with 
shareholders, and encourage managers to act in shareholders' best interest. The issuing of 
debt to managers might shift this alignment toward debt holders' interests, and the results 
of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and Yermack (2010) generally support this 
assertion. As mentioned above, CEOs with high inside debt appear to manage the firm 
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more conservatively, a practice that is in the interest of debt-holders, not shareholders. If 
this is indeed the case, debt-like compensation should be negatively related to the value 
of the firm's equity. However, the theoretical and empirical results of Edmans (2008) and 
Gerakos (2007), respectively, suggest that optimal contracting may involve the use of 
debt-like compensation, even in excess of the manager’s equity holdings, meaning that 
debt-like compensation would not negatively affect the firm's stock price when used at 
the optimal level. Edmans (2008) predicts that debt-like compensation could be a part of 
an optimal executive compensation contract. Empirical evidence is somewhat mixed. 
Both Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2007) find evidence of factors 
contributing to the use of debt-like compensation that are consistent with optimal 
contracting.  
 Based on extant theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, we expect that 
the value of a firm’s equity should be negatively related to deviations from the optimal 
CEO relative debt-to-equity. Thus, we hypothesize that a decrease in the deviation from 
optimal CEO holdings will have a positive impact of firm equity value, on average, for 
our full sample of firms. However, previous research suggests that the impact of debt-
like compensation may be asymmetric across firms, possibly depending on the marginal 
benefits and costs of approaching the optimal level for a particular firm.  
For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that the negative consequences 
of debt compensation will be most significant when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity is 
greater than one. Wei and Yermack (2010) find that stock prices react negatively to the 
CEO’s relative debt-to-equity ratio, but only when this ratio was greater than one. 
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According to their results, stock prices do not react significantly for firms where the 
CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was less than one. A second possibility is that the costs 
associated with reducing the distance from the optimal level may be asymmetric 
depending on whether the CEO’s holdings were greater or less than the optimal level. 
For example, the firm may encounter fewer obstacles and lower cost when increasing the 
CEO’s pension benefits or choosing not to replace expiring or exercised options or stock 
that the CEO has sold. In neither case is the firm required to make large grants of 
additional compensation with associated up-front direct costs. This may not be the case 
when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity exceeds the optimal level. Reducing CEO debt 
compensation will likely be costly or difficult; the CEO would likely fight to preserve 
retirement benefits, and it may be impossible for the firm to reduce the CEO’s deferred 
compensation. Increasing the CEO’s equity holdings can also be difficult; the outrage 
factor for large stock and option grants may be prohibitive. Thus, the costs of adjusting 
CEO relative debt-to-equity to the optimal level may be higher when the CEO’s actual 
relative debt-to-equity is above one or above the estimate optimal level, and would need 
to be reduced.  
Further, the firm’s monitoring mechanisms could affect the agency costs of debt, 
altering the benefits from reducing these costs through executive compensation. Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003) find that high institutional ownership can act to reduce the agency 
costs of debt. When high institutional ownership is not in place, the optimal use of debt 
compensation may become relatively more important. Our second hypothesis stems from 
the expectation that the negative relation between abnormal returns and changes in the 
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deviation from optimal CEO holdings will be concentrated in firms where the CEO’s 
holdings were relatively low or where the firm did not have other mechanisms in place 
to reduce the agency costs of debt. Formally, we hypothesize that abnormal 
announcement returns to firm equity will be negatively related to the change in the 
deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity primarily when the CEO’s holdings 
had been below one, below the empirically modeled optimal level, or when the firm had 
relatively low institutional holdings. 
3.3 The data 
3.3.1 Sample description 
 The dataset was collected from a number of sources. The initial sample is from 
Execucomp, encompassing all firm/executive combinations from 2006 through 2008, the 
period that corresponds to the recently imposed requirement for disclosure of executive 
pension benefits. This set was reduced to include only CEOs that have a non-missing 
value for their debt and equity holdings. We follow Wei and Yermack (2010) by 
measuring CEO debt holdings as the sum of the CEO’s pension value and the total value 
of deferred compensation. We rely on this lower-bound measure of debt-like 
compensation because disclosure of other CEO debt holdings is not generally required. 
We measure CEO equity as the total value of stock and options held by the CEO. 
Observations with missing values for CEO stock and option compensation were also 
excluded. Because our tests are based on changes in the CEO's debt and equity holdings, 
we require each firm to have non-missing values in consecutive years to be considered in 
the final analysis. However, we include all firms with non-missing data in a particular 
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year when estimating optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity ratios. This helps to avoid 
survival bias issues in estimating the optimal levels of CEO relative debt-to-equity 
ratios.  
Firm level variables were collected from Compustat. Abnormal stock returns at 
proxy release were calculated based on a simple market model using EVENTUS. 
Governance variables are from Risk Metrics and institutional ownership is from 
Thomson Financial. Firm level variables follow Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and 
Gerakos (2007). Any observation that did not have data available was excluded from the 
dataset. This restricts the sample with non-missing data for the abnormal return analysis 
using ―sophisticated‖ models for optimal CEO holdings to 904 firms.  
3.3.2 Variable calculations 
 The initial dependent variable of interest is the relative ratio of the CEO's debt-
to-equity holdings. We proxy for the CEO's debt holdings using the present value of the 
CEO's pension benefits and the CEO’s total deferred compensation. We measure CEO 
equity as the total value of the CEO's stock and option holdings. The CEO’s relative 
debt-to-equity is calculated as the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm’s debt-
to-equity ratio, and winsorized at the 99
th
 percentile. First, we consider a simple measure 
for optimal CEO holdings, where the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity equals one. This 
corresponds to the point at which the CEO should have no incentive to risk shift, as 
discussed above. We then consider a number of alternate ―sophisticated‖ empirical 
models for optimal CEO holdings. In model 1, the optimal level of the CEO's relative 
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debt-to-equity ratio is estimated as the predicted value from the following Tobit model 
(including 2-digit SIC industry effects): 
CEO relative debt-to-equity = γ0 + γ1 * Age + γ2 * Tenure + γ3 * Size + γ4 * Growth 
Opportunities + γ5 * Tax Status + γ6 * Liquidity Constrained + γ7 * AAA or AA + γ8 * A 
+ γ9 * BBB + γ9 * Market to Book + γ10 * PP&E + γ11* Idiosyncratic Risk + ε  
The CEO and firm level variables included in the model above (model 1) follow 
the results of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2007). These include CEO 
age, CEO tenure, firm size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets), growth 
opportunities (measured by R&D expenditures to sales), an indicator for if the firm has a 
tax-loss carry-forward, and indicator for if the firm had negative operating income, 
indicators for the firm’s public debt rating (AAA/AA, A, or BBB), market-to-book 
assets, net PP&E scaled by assets, and the error from a market model from the prior 24 
months as a measure of idiosyncratic risk.
18
 In model 2, we incorporate governance 
variables following Gerakos (2007), including the firm’s GIM Index (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrik, 2003), the percentage of outsiders on the board, and the natural logarithm of 
board size, and we add the firm’s book leverage in model 3. In model 4, we remove the 
governance variables and use only firms that are relatively well-governed (have high 
institutional ownership) to estimate the model, and then calculate optimal CEO holdings 
for all firms (both firms with relatively weak and relative strong governance) using this 
model. This allows us to estimate the model for optimal CEO holdings based on firms 
where the CEO’s actual holdings are more likely to depend on optimal contracting, 
                                                 
18
 Idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the error from a market model following Gerakos (2007). 
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rather than CEO power. In doing so, we do not allow firms with poor governance (and 
likely high CEO power) to bias our estimated model for optimal CEO relative debt-to-
equity. 
The errors from the above models are used as measures of the deviation from the 
optimal level of CEO relative debt-to-equity holdings. We then calculate the change in 
the absolute deviation from the optimal level from t to t+1 as the absolute value of the 
error at t+1 minus the absolute value of the error at time t. Additionally, for the purposes 
of univariate tests, we construct an indicator for a large decrease in absolute deviation, 
which takes a value of one if the decrease was above the 90th percentile in sample, and 
zero otherwise. 
We conduct our analysis in an event study framework, following the 
recommendations of Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1997). Brown and Warner (1985) show that event studies on short windows using a 
market model for expected returns are generally well-specified for sample sizes greater 
than 50. 
 The primary dependent variable of interest is the abnormal stock return around 
the proxy release date, which is calculated using a standard market model with the value-
weighted return from CRSP used as the market return. The cumulative abnormal returns 
are estimated over the two-day period beginning on the proxy statement release date
19
, 
following Wei and Yermack (2010). For univariate analyses, we follow the 
recommendations of Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and conduct our tests using 
                                                 
19
 Firm proxy statements contain information about the firm’s annual meeting as well as CEO and top 
executive compensation and director information (Brickley, 1986). 
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standardized cumulative abnormal returns, or abnormal returns adjusted for the 
estimation error from the market model used to calculate abnormal returns.  
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 Table B7 includes a selection of summary statistics for the sample. The primary 
variables of interest are the measures of stock abnormal returns and the change in 
deviation from the optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity holdings. The abnormal stock 
returns are calculated using a standard market model over the two-day window 
beginning on the date of the proxy release. The median (mean) abnormal return for our 
sample is approximately 0.2% (0.4%) over the two-day event window. The change in the 
deviation from the optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity is calculated as described above. 
The median (mean) change in the deviation is approximately -0.019 (-0.2), which is 
relatively small compared to the median CEO relative debt-to-equity of 0.874.  
Additionally, summary statistics for variables relating to possible contracting 
concerns and control variables are included in the table as well. CEOs in our sample are 
typically older than in the sample used by Wei and Yermack (2010). The average CEO 
in our sample is 62 years old, compared to their average of 57. Our sample firms appear 
to be generally similar to Wei and Yermack (2010), with similar values for average total 
assets ($22 billion), leverage (25%), R&D to sales (0.022), and firm PP&E to assets 
(0.28).  
Table B8 presents correlations between the main variables of interest and many 
of the possible determinants of CEO relative debt-to-equity. The CEO’s relative debt-to-
equity is typically positively correlated with the CEO’s age, firm growth opportunities, 
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and firm idiosyncratic risk. The CEO’s relative debt-to-equity is negatively correlated 
with the size of the firm, the size of the firm’s board, and the percentage of outsiders on 
the board. The signs of these correlations are generally consistent with other studies of 
CEO debt compensation.  
3.4 Analysis and results 
The first step of our analysis involves the estimation of optimal CEO debt-to-
equity holdings. We begin with a simple model, where a value of one is used as the 
optimal level of CEO relative debt-to-equity. Table B9 presents results from four 
alternate Tobit regressions used to model optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity based on 
firm and CEO characteristics. The Tobit model was chosen to account for the limited 
nature of our dependent variable (it cannot take a value below zero). Consistent with 
Gerakos (2007), CEO age, firm PP&E, and indicators for bond ratings above a ―junk‖ 
level appear to be significant determinants of CEO debt-to-equity with the predicted 
(positive) sign. We also find that firm size, growth opportunities, the size of the firm’s 
board, and the firm’s book leverage are significant determinants of CEO relative debt-to-
equity, depending on the model selected. Using each of the models, we calculate the 
deviation from the estimated optimal level of CEO relative debt-to-equity. We then 
analyze the impact of the change in the absolute value of the deviation from the optimal 
level, and conduct an event study to determine the impact that the deviation has on the 
value of the firm’s equity.  
First, we analyze the impact of a large decrease in the deviation on a univariate 
basis. Second, we examine the implications of the change in the absolute deviation on 
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the value of equity in a regression framework. In each case, we also allow the effect of 
the change in error to differ for firms where the deviation could be more likely to have a 
negative impact of firm equity values.
20
 We use a block-diagonal regression framework 
similar to Wei and Yermack (2010), beginning with our simple model of optimal 
incentives. We then expand this analysis to incorporate more sophisticated models of 
optimal CEO debt-to-equity.  
We begin by presenting univariate tests of our hypothesis. These results are 
presented in Table B10, with a separate test corresponding to each of the models for 
optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity. In Panel A, we sort all firms in the sample based on 
whether the firm had a large decrease in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-equity, 
and calculate t-statistics for the difference in the mean standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns
21
 for two groups: when the decrease in the deviation is large, above the 90
th
 
percentile within sample, versus firms where the decrease in the deviation is below the 
90
th
 percentile. We focus on firms where the decrease is above the 90
th
 percentile 
because firms with a large decrease in the deviation should be most likely to experience 
a positive stock price reaction under our hypotheses. We concentrate on large decreases 
rather than large increases in the deviation because the prediction underlying the 
motivation for our analysis is that CEO debt compensation can have a positive impact on 
                                                 
20
 The results of Wei and Yermack (2010) suggest that the market’s reaction to the CEO’s relative debt-to-
equity will be dependent on whether or not it is greater than one, which corresponds to a critical level 
based on Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
21
 The cummulative abnormal returns are standardized following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), 
placing more emphasis on observations for which the market model provides more precise estimates of 
abnormal returns. 
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equity value if it is used optimally. A positive reaction to a decrease in the deviation 
would be consistent with this. 
The abnormal returns presented in Table B10 are average cumulative abnormal 
returns (not standardized) for each group over the two-day event window beginning on 
the proxy release date. This period was chosen to be consistent with Wei and Yermack 
(2010). Only when we use the simple model to determine the optimal level do we find a 
significant positive stock price reaction in response to CEO debt-to-equity moving closer 
to the optimum. In this case, we find a significant positive abnormal return of 82 basis 
points (p-value = 0.01) on average for firms that have a large decrease in the deviation. 
This is 50 basis point higher than the abnormal return earned by firms that did not 
experience a large decrease (p-value = 0.04). In tests (2)-(5) in Panel A, where more 
―sophisticated‖ empirical models of optimal CEO holdings are used, there does not 
appear to be a positive reaction to a decrease in the deviation. The mean abnormal 
returns for firms with a large decrease in the deviation range from 0 to 47 basis points 
with p-values ranging between 0.12 and 0.64. None of these are significantly different 
from the abnormal returns to firms that do not experience a large decrease in the 
deviation.  
One possible explanation is that the response to changes in the deviation is 
asymmetric across firms depending on prior CEO relative debt-to-equity or on the firm’s 
governance, as discussed in our second hypothesis. In Panel B, we take steps to account 
for this by first sorting firms based on whether the beginning of year CEO relative debt-
to-equity ratio is greater than one (tests 1-4), greater than the predicted optimum from 
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the model (test 5), or the firm had relatively weak governance (test 6). We then sort 
firms based on having a large decrease in the absolute deviation from optimal CEO 
relative debt-to-equity, relative to the subsample. Within subsamples where the CEO 
relative debt-to-equity had been lower than the optimum, we find mixed evidence of 
firms experiencing a significantly higher abnormal return when the firm has a large 
decrease in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-equity. When the simple model is 
used, the average abnormal return to a firm with a large decrease is approximately zero, 
and not significantly different from the mean abnormal return for firms without a large 
decrease (p-value = 0.84). A positive abnormal return to equity is only found when the 
firm had a large decrease in the deviation from the more sophisticated model optimum 
and the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity had been below one or the firm had relatively 
weak governance. In tests (3) and (4) in Panel B, firms with a large decrease in the error 
experience an abnormal return of approximately 100 basis points (p-values 
approximately 0.07), significantly larger than the 23 basis point abnormal return earned 
by firms with no large decrease in the deviation (with p-values around 0.05). In test (6) 
in Panel B, firms with relatively weak governance earn a 118 basis point abnormal return 
(p-value = 0.00) in response to a large decrease in the deviation. This amounts to a 66 
basis point higher abnormal return than firms without a large decrease (p-value = 0.03).  
 We next consider the impact of a continuous measure of the change in the 
deviation from optimal CEO holdings on the value of the firm's equity, controlling for 
changes in the CEO’s cash compensation. The dependent variable used is the abnormal 
stock return over the two-day event window beginning on the proxy release date, as 
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described above. In Table B11, we estimate the impact of a change in the deviation for 
all firms. For the full set of firms, there does not appear to be a significant reaction on 
average to a change in the deviation from the optimal level. Coefficients on the change 
in the deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity (denoted as the change in 
absolute error in the table) range between -0.00002 and -0.00005, with p-values between 
0.69 and 0.95.  
Results from the regression analysis of our second hypothesis are presented in 
Table B12. We allow the impact of the change in absolute deviation from the optimal 
CEO relative debt-to-equity to differ depending on whether that ratio was less than one 
at the beginning of the year (columns 1-4), was less than the predicted optimal level 
(column 5), or whether the firm had relatively weak governance (column 6). The 
independent variable of interest is the change in the absolute deviation from optimal 
CEO relative debt-to-equity when the ratio was less than one, when the ratio was below 
the predicted optimum, or when the firm had relatively weak governance, as discussed in 
detail above.  
Similar to the univariate tests, the results from the block-diagonal regressions are 
mixed. Abnormal returns are found to be negatively related to the change in the absolute 
deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity, but only when the ratio was less 
than one. For the simple model, the coefficient on the change in the deviation from the 
optimal level is -0.00027 (p-value = 0.00) when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was 
below one at time t=0. The results are similar using the more ―sophisticated‖ models, 
with coefficients ranging between -0.0033 to -0.0043 (p-values approximately 0.00) 
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when the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was below one at time t=0. Unlike the univariate 
tests, however, no significant relation between abnormal returns and the change in the 
deviation when the model based on firms with relatively high institutional ownership is 
used. A statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.00071 (p-value = 0.38) is found when 
regressing abnormal returns on the change in the deviation from optimal CEO holdings 
for firms with relatively low institutional ownership. This is seemingly contrary to the 
positive abnormal reaction to a large decrease in the deviation that is found in univariate 
testing, suggesting that further analysis of this relation is warranted in future research. 
Taken together, the results provide only weak support for the theoretical 
prediction that debt-like compensation can actually benefit equity holders when used as 
a part of optimal compensation contracts. Future research should consider further 
extending models for CEO relative debt-to-equity, and examining alternate (non-linear) 
specifications for the relation between changes in the deviation and abnormal returns to 
firm equity. One interesting result is that stock prices react positively to a large decrease 
in the deviation when the firm had relatively low institutional ownership. Future research 
might consider why no significant relationship is found when analyzing the continuous 
measure of the change in the deviation. One possibility is that the relationship is non-
linear, which could be investigated in future work. 
Another concern is that underlying our analysis is a joint hypothesis problem; in 
essence our investigation tests both the relation between optimal CEO debt 
compensation and firm equity value, and that our empirical model for the optimal level 
of CEO relative debt-to-equity is correct. Our failure to find significant results using 
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certain models could be due in part to inadequate models for the optimal level of CEO 
holdings. Further research is needed to determine if the models are inadequate, and if so, 
how they can be improved. If the models are adequate, future work should investigate 
why investors do not view the optimal use of CEO relative debt-to-equity as value 
increasing. 
3.5 Robustness checks 
 In addition to using multiple empirical specifications for the optimal level of 
CEO relative debt-to-equity, we take a number of steps to determine the robustness of 
our results. One concern, mentioned above, stems from the joint hypothesis nature of our 
tests. We are testing both the hypothesis that optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity has a 
positive impact of equity value and that our empirical model for the optimal level is 
appropriate. Stemming from this, one possibility is that our results (either significant or 
insignificant) could be due to large variation in the estimates for the underlying optimal 
level of CEO holdings rather than changes in the holdings themselves. If that is the case, 
it could suggest that our results are driven primarily by the specification of our empirical 
model rather than the CEO’s actual holdings. This is problematic because we do not 
have an independent test for our underlying models being correct.  
We use two alternate approaches to address the concern that our results are 
driven by large variation in the predicted values of optimal holdings rather than actual 
CEO holdings. First, we exclude firms where the predicted optimal level has a large 
standard deviation across time. Our results are robust to this, even if we drop firms that 
have higher than median standard deviation. The sign and significance of all results 
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described above remain similar in all cases. This suggests that our results are not driven 
by large variations in the underlying predicted optimal levels.  
While this addresses the concern that large variation in the fitted values from our 
empirical models is driving the results, it is also possible that changes in the fitted values 
are the cause for our findings, even if the fitted values for a particular firm do not 
fluctuate greatly over time. To directly address each of these possible concerns, we keep 
the optimal level fixed, using the fitted value at t=0 as the optimal level for both t=0 and 
t=1. With this alternative, all variation in our measure of the change in deviation is due 
solely to changes in CEO’s actual holdings. Our results are robust to this as well. This 
suggests that our results are driven by changes in the CEO’s actual holdings as they 
relate to the optimal level, and are not driven by changes in the estimated optimal level 
itself. While this helps to address some of the concerns related to poor empirical models 
for optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity driving our results, further analysis is needed to 
determine whether the models are adequate, and if not, how they can be improved. We 
leave this for future research. 
Another possible concern is that we do not have controls for other information 
that is potentially released in firm proxy statements regarding the firm’s annual meeting. 
This might influence our results if the information is new to investors, affects the way 
investors value the firm or its equity, and is related to the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity. 
The collection of the necessary controls would require reading individual firm proxy 
statements for each observation in the analysis, and hand-collecting the controls. Wei 
and Yermack (2010) undertake this task, which is much more feasible for their sample of 
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approximately 200 firms than our sample of nearly 1000. Instead, we take a random 
sample of 50 firms in our final dataset, and hand-collect the other proxy control 
variables. 
For this subsample, we follow Wei and Yermack (2010) by collecting indicators 
that take a value of one if the firm nominated new independent directors (Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990) or nominated new grey directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), 
respectively. We include three indicators for if the firm announced proposed governance 
changes that could benefit shareholders, such as declassifying the board of directors, 
instituting majority voting for the election of directors, or removing super-majority 
voting requirements (Faleye, 2007). We also include the indicators for if shareholders 
proposed changes relating to governance, executive compensation, or social issues 
(Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walking, 1996). Finally, we include an indicator that takes a 
value of one if the firm made its first disclosure personal use of the firm’s aircraft by the 
CEO (Yermack, 2006). 
We are able to collect these variables for 49 of the 50 firms randomly chosen for 
the subsample. In only one case, for the indicator of new grey director nominations, do 
we find no firms in the subsample for which such an event occurred. Using these 
indicators as controls, we replicated our regression analysis on this subset of our sample. 
Our results are generally robust. In two cases (both in Table B12), the change in the 
deviation from optimal CEO holdings no longer has a significant impact on the firm’s 
abnormal returns. No significant relationship is found using the simple model or the first 
―sophisticated‖ model in Table B12. However, the lack of significance appears to be 
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driven by the sample size rather than the control variables, as coefficients become 
insignificant within the random subset even when the controls are excluded.   
3.6 Discussion 
This section empirically examines the implications of deviations from the 
optimal use of debt-like executive compensation for the market value of firm equity. 
Debt-like compensation may exist in a number of forms. Our analysis focuses on a 
portion of debt-like compensation measured by the present value of the CEO’s pension 
benefits payable after retirement and the total balance of the CEO’s deferred 
compensation. Following Wei and Yermack (2010), we specifically consider the 
implications of the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity, or the CEO’s debt-to-equity divided 
by the firm’s debt-to-equity. Jensen and Meckling (1976) theorize that a shift in the debt-
like compensation of the manager may encourage risk shifting, in this case reducing the 
risk of the firm in a manner that increases the value of the debt compensation, but 
negatively impacts the value of the firm's equity. This is primarily the case when the 
CEO’s relative debt-to-equity takes a value greater than one. Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) document that an increase in the pension value of the CEO is correlated with a 
decrease in the riskiness of the firm, as measured by the distance to default. Wei and 
Yermack (2010) provide additional evidence relating CEO relative debt-to-equity to firm 
risk, and show that the firm stock prices react negatively to the first announcement of 
CEO relative debt-to-equity when this ratio is greater than one.  
However, an alternate theoretical prediction from Edmans (2008) suggests that 
high CEO debt-to-equity may not always be suboptimal for shareholders, and may even 
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increase the value of equity. We empirically test this prediction by considering various 
models of optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity, but find only weak evidence linking 
deviations from optimal CEO holdings to firm equity value. However, the lack of 
consistent positive reaction to a decrease in error, along with weak regression results, 
suggests that our findings should be interpreted with care.  
Our tests depend on the models used to determine the optimal level being good 
models. One concern is that our results (either significant or insignificant) reflect the 
inadequacies of our underlying empirical models for optimal CEO holdings. Further 
research is needed to determine whether current models for optimal CEO debt-to-equity 
are inadequate, and if so, whether the models can be improved. Or, if the models are 
adequate, future research should examine why equity holders do not view an 
improvement in managerial incentives (moving CEO relative debt-to-equity nearer the 
optimal level) as value increasing. 
 Our findings also have other implications for future research. First, further 
research is needed to analyze the relationship between optimal CEO holdings and firm 
equity value when institutional ownership is low. This represents a scenario when the 
firm may lack mechanisms in place to reduce the agency costs of debt, and thus benefit 
greatly from the reductions due to the optimal use of debt-like compensation. 
Additionally, while Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) show that CEO pensions are 
negatively related to the incidence of certain public debt covenants, only a limited 
number of other studies have empirically considered the implications of debt-like 
compensation for factors influencing agency costs. Future studies might more 
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extensively examine possible effects of debt-like compensation on CEO decision-
making as well as other firm outcomes, particularly focusing on changes in the firm or 
other events that would be consistent with a decrease in agency costs related to the 
optimal use of debt-like compensation.  
74 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this research effort, we test recent theoretical predictions linking factors that 
influence the CEO’s view of risk, overconfidence and debt-like compensation, to CEO 
forced turnover and firm equity value. First, we analyze the impact that excessively low 
or excessively high CEO overconfidence has on the likelihood of the CEO facing forced 
turnover. We find that excessively diffident CEOs and excessively overconfident CEOs 
face significantly greater hazards of forced turnover than moderately overconfident 
CEOs face. The results point to the importance of considering the whole range of CEO 
confidence levels in theoretical and empirical analyses, and are broadly consistent with 
the view that CEOs with moderate levels of overconfidence maximize firm value (Goel 
and Thakor, 2008; Hackbarth, 2008).  
Second, we investigate the impact that deviations from the optimal use of debt-
like executive compensation have on the market value of firm equity. This analysis aims 
to distinguish between two alternate theoretical predictions. One prediction is that the 
use of debt-like compensation for managers negatively impacts the value of the firm's 
equity because of increased agency conflicts with equity holders. An alternate prediction 
is that debt-like compensation may increase the value of equity through a reduction in 
the agency costs of debt. We test this prediction by analyzing deviations from optimal 
CEO relative debt-to-equity, and find weak evidence that CEO debt compensation can 
increase firm equity value. Taken together, the results suggest that the CEO’s view of 
risk is a relevant consideration for the firm, which may impact not only the value of the 
firm as a whole, but claims against it, and employment outcomes for the CEO. 
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Figure A1: Graph of Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates across three CEO 
confidence groups: excessively diffident, excessively overconfident, and moderately 
overconfident. P-values from the log-rank test and the Tarone-Ware (1977) test for the 
null hypothesis of equality of survivor/failure functions are both less than 0.01. 
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Table B1 
Summary statistics for test and control variables. 
Details for the confidence measures are in the text. Annualized returns are the annualized return over the tenure of 
the CEO beginning the month the CEO was hired if the CEO was hired in the last five years, or the returns over the 
last five years of the CEO’s tenure, adjusted by the three-digit SIC industry median return. We winsorize these 
returns at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample size using netbuy-based and investment-based measures is 9,063 
CEO-firm-years. The sample size for the option holder based measure is reduced to 5,353 CEO-firm-years because 
a number of CEOs cannot be classified with this measure.   
Panel A: by CEO Mean Median 
Excessive diffidence (option holder) 0.110  
Excessive overconfidence (option holder) 0.391  
Excessive diffidence (netbuy excl. options) 0.361  
Excessive overconfidence (netbuy excl. options) 0.216  
Excessive diffidence (netbuy incl. options) 0.367  
Excessive overconfidence (netbuy incl. options) 0.260  
Excessive diffidence (investment) 0.174  
Excessive overconfidence (investment) 0.175  
 
Panel B: by CEO-firm-year   
Excessive diffidence (option Holder) 0.091  
Excessive overconfidence (option Holder) 0.360  
Excessive diffidence (netbuy excl. options) 0.273  
Excessive overconfidence (netbuy excl. options) 0.148  
Excessive diffidence (netbuy incl. options) 0.278  
Excessive overconfidence (netbuy incl. options) 0.186  
Excessive diffidence (investment) 0.115  
Excessive overconfidence (investment) 0.141  
Annualized return over CEO tenure (max 5 years) 0.173 0.102 
Percent ownership in firm 0.028 0.004 
CEO age (years) 55.658 56.000 
CEO tenure (years) 7.626 5.000 
CEO salary ($ thousands) 591.982 537.500 
CEO bonus ($ thousands) 586.399 320.640 
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Table B2 
Forced turnover rates by CEO confidence level. 
This table presents the proportions of CEOs in each confidence group that are subjected to a forced turnover. 
Confidence classifications are defined in Table B1.  
  Confidence measure based on: 
CEO confidence level Option holdings 
and exercises 
Net stock 
purchases 
including options 
Net stock 
purchases 
excluding options 
Industry-adjusted 
investment 
 
Excessively diffident 3.15% 3.34% 3.27% 5.17%  
Moderately overconfident 0.90% 2.14% 2.21% 2.06%  
Excessively overconfident 2.12% 2.97% 3.07% 3.40%  
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Table B3 
Cox regressions modeling the probability of forced turnover. 
This table presents results from a Cox proportional hazards model of the hazard of forced turnover. The dependent 
variable equals one for forced turnovers and zero otherwise. Independent variables are defined in Table B1. The 
impact of the CEO’s percent ownership in the firm is allowed to vary with time to satisfy the assumptions of the 
Cox model. p-values are in parentheses.  
Confidence measure based on: 
  
Option holdings 
and exercises 
 
Net stock purchases 
including options 
 
Net stock purchases 
excluding options 
 
Investment rate 
quintile 
 
CEO excessive 
diffidence dummy 
0.8695 0.5665 0.4960 0.7454  
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO excessive 
overconfidence 
dummy 
0.7100 0.4420 0.4491 0.4235  
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  
      
Industry adjusted 
stock return over 
CEO tenure 
−0.5894 −0.8983 −0.8837 −0.8798  
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO percent 
ownership in the firm 
−0.3324 −0.8812 −0.8725 −0.7499  
(0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  
      
CEO salary −0.0010 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005  
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.02)  
      
CEO bonus −0.0005 −0.0011 −0.0011 −0.0010  
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO age −0.0482 −0.0379 −0.0380 −0.0400  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO tenure −0.0184 −0.0343 −0.0339 −0.0270  
 (0.37) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  
      
Difference in 
confidence 
coefficients test p-
value 
0.52 0.50 0.81 0.12  
N 5,353 9,063 9,063 9,063  
   
8
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Table B4 
Cox regressions modeling the probability of forced turnover for firms with strong and weak board governance. 
This table presents results cut on board governance strength. Weak board governance firms are those that are jointly insider dominated, the CEO is chair, and the 
board is classified; other firms are strong board governance firms. Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. p-values are in parentheses. 
 Firms with strong board governance  Firms with weak board governance 
 Confidence measure based on: 
 Option 
holdings and 
exercises 
Net stock 
purchases 
including 
options 
Net stock 
purchases 
excluding 
options 
Investment 
rate quintile 
Option 
holdings and 
exercises 
Net stock 
purchases 
including 
options 
Net stock 
purchases 
excluding 
options 
Investment rate 
quintile 
Excessive diffidence 
dummy 
1.0639 0.6141 0.4864 0.6509 0.8103 0.3953 0.4792 1.1893 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.24) (0.20) (0.12) (0.00) 
         
Excessive 
overconfidence dummy 
0.9538 0.6445 0.6136 0.5071 0.2913 −0.3748 −0.2933 0.4331 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.60) (0.41) (0.55) (0.27) 
        
         
Stock return over 
tenure 
−0.6882 −0.9644 −0.9457 −0.9439 −0.3591 −0.6704 −0.6667 −0.6568 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
         
CEO percent ownership −0.1933 −0.9241 −0.8933 −0.7640 −0.5709 −0.9478 −0.9652 −0.9228 
(0.71) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.62) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
         
CEO salary −0.0010 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 −0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.02) (0.57) (0.37) (0.40) (0.53) 
         
CEO bonus −0.0006 −0.0012 −0.0012 −0.0012 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0006 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
         
CEO age −0.0451 −0.0334 −0.0336 −0.0355 −0.0600 −0.0488 −0.0476 −0.0478 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
CEO tenure −0.0116 −0.0349 −0.0337 −0.0290 −0.0043 −0.0254 −0.0273 −0.0204 
 (0.62) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.91) (0.31) (0.29) (0.41) 
         
N 4,093 6,839 6,839 6,839 1,260 2,224 2,224 2,224 
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Table B5  
Cox regressions modeling the probability of forced turnover versus voluntary turnover. 
This table presents results from a Cox proportional hazards model of the hazard of forced turnover versus voluntary 
turnover. The dependent variable equals one for forced turnovers and zero otherwise. Measures of excessive 
diffidence and overconfidence are as defined in Table B2. Returns are the annual return over the tenure of the CEO, 
up to 5 years, adjusted by the three-digit SIC industry median. The impact CEO’s percent ownership in the firm is 
allowed to vary with time, in order to satisfy the assumptions of the Cox model. p-values in parentheses p-values for 
test of equal coefficients across the excessive diffidence and excessive overconfidence dummy variables are 
provided at the bottom. 
Confidence measure based on: 
  
Option holdings 
and exercises 
 
Net stock purchases 
including options 
 
Net stock purchases 
excluding options 
 
Investment rate 
quintile 
 
Excessive diffidence 
dummy 
0.8798 0.4010 0.3645 0.4548  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  
      
Excessive 
overconfidence 
dummy 
0.7100 0.2627 0.4109 0.3071  
(0.02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.08)  
      
Stock return over 
tenure 
−0.3312 −0.3604 −0.3570 −0.3594  
(0.20) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
      
CEO percent 
ownership 
0.1376 −0.1498 −0.1744 −0.1167  
(0.80) (0.71) (0.67) (0.77)  
      
CEO salary −0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005  
 (0.45) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  
      
CEO bonus −0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0006 −0.0005  
 (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO age −0.0877 −0.0659 −0.0651 −0.0654  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO tenure 0.0004 −0.0247 −0.0257 −0.0212  
 (0.98) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)  
      
Difference in 
coefficient test p-
value 
0.49 0.44 0.81 0.47  
N 672 1,242 1,242 1,242  
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Table B6 
Cox regressions modeling the probability of voluntary turnover versus nonturnovers. 
This table presents results from a Cox proportional hazards model of the hazard of voluntary turnover versus no 
turnover. The dependent variable equals one for forced turnovers and zero otherwise. Measures of excessive 
diffidence and overconfidence are as defined in Table B2. Returns are the annual return over the tenure of the CEO, 
up to 5 years, adjusted by the three-digit SIC industry median. The impact CEO’s percent ownership in the firm is 
allowed to vary with time, in order to satisfy the assumptions of the Cox model. P-values for test of equal 
coefficients across the excessive diffidence and excessive overconfidence dummy variables are provided at the 
bottom. p-values in parentheses. 
Confidence measure based on: 
  
Option holdings 
and exercises 
 
Net stock purchases 
including options 
 
Net stock purchases 
excluding options 
 
Investment rate 
quintile 
 
Excessive diffidence 
dummy 
0.2642 0.1796 0.0395 −0.1671  
(0.10) (0.07) (0.69) (0.20)  
      
Excessive 
overconfidence 
dummy 
0.0228 0.0367 −0.0654 0.1149  
(0.87) (0.74) (0.59) (0.33)  
      
Stock return over 
tenure 
−0.1435 −0.2067 −0.1880 −0.1968  
(0.42) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)  
      
CEO percent 
ownership 
−1.2157 −1.1256 −1.0750 −1.0385  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO salary −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002  
 (0.28) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
      
CEO bonus 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000  
 (0.92) (0.74) (0.85) (0.76)  
      
CEO age 0.1201 0.0985 0.0982 0.0990  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
      
CEO tenure −0.0097 −0.0067 −0.0054 −0.0051  
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.32) (0.34)  
      
Difference in 
coefficient test p-
value 
0.08 0.22 0.42 0.07  
N 5,247 8,820 8,820 8,820  
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Table B7 
Summary statistics. 
Below are summary statistics for variables of interest. CEO Relative Debt-to-Equity is the CEO’s debt-to-equity 
ratio divided by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, and winsorized at the 99th percentile. Growth Opportunities is 
measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. Market-to-Book is the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. Idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the error from a market model of returns, following Gerakos 
(2007). Abnormal stock returns are calculated using a standard market model and are measured over a two-day 
event window (0,1). 
Variable Mean S.D 25th Median 75th N 
CEO Relative Debt-to-Equity 5.359 22.573 0.257 0.874 2.667 1878 
Tenure 6.478 6.518 2.000 5.000 9.000 1878 
Age 62.227 7.707 57.000 63.000 68.000 1878 
Size 22.363 1.536 21.283 22.181 23.377 1878 
Book Leverage 0.250 0.152 0.139 0.237 0.341 1878 
Growth Opportunities 0.022 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.015 1878 
Market-to-Book 2.695 9.323 1.390 2.007 3.184 1878 
PP&E 0.280 0.243 0.088 0.204 0.439 1878 
Tax Status 0.394 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 1878 
Liquidity Constraint 0.028 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 1878 
AAA of AA 0.036 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 1878 
A 0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 1878 
BBB 0.315 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.000 1878 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.001 0.095 -0.046 -0.003 0.038 1878 
GIM Index 9.774 2.531 8.000 10.000 11.000 1878 
Board Size 10.208 2.255 9.000 10.000 12.000 1878 
Outsider Percentage 0.782 0.118 0.714 0.800 0.888 1878 
Institutional Ownership 0.796 0.162 0.701 0.818 0.925 1878 
Change in Salary (Thousands) 23.202 149.216 0.000 35.000 68.462 904 
Change in Bonus (Thousands) 43.338 2621.18 0.000 0.000 0.000 904 
Abnormal Stock Return 0.004 0.045 -0.015 0.002 0.022 904 
Change in Absolute Error (model 1) -0.208 19.100 -1.438 -0.019 1.283 904 
 
  
9
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Table B8 
Correlations matrix.  
Variables are described in Table B7. 
  
CEO 
Relative 
D-to-E Age Size 
Book 
Lev. 
Growth 
Opp. PP&E 
Tax 
Status 
Liq. 
Cons. Risk 
GIM 
Index 
Board 
Size 
Out. 
Per. 
Abn. 
Stock 
Ret. 
               CEO Relative 
 Debt-to-Equity 1 
            
Age 
 
0.049 1 
           
Size 
 
-0.137 0.038 1 
          
Book Leverage -0.237 -0.017 0.057 1 
         
Growth Opportunities 0.152 -0.026 -0.020 -0.051 1 
        
PP&E 
 
-0.011 0.034 0.470 0.006 -0.040 1 
       
Tax Status 
 
-0.001 -0.068 -0.151 0.031 0.100 -0.103 1 
      
Liquidity Constraint -0.036 0.026 -0.005 0.052 0.038 -0.056 -0.030 1 
     
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.011 -0.045 -0.078 -0.057 -0.024 -0.005 0.044 0.003 1 
    
GIM Index 
 
-0.070 0.035 0.012 -0.015 -0.063 -0.115 -0.083 0.006 -0.006 1 
   
Board Size 
 
-0.144 -0.007 0.518 0.004 -0.085 0.233 -0.105 -0.036 -0.039 0.183 1 
  
Outsider Percentage -0.064 0.024 0.153 0.087 0.035 0.104 0.055 0.021 -0.049 0.139 0.077 1 
 
Abnormal Stock Return 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.019 -0.001 -0.028 -0.046 0.061 0.005 -0.003 0.030 -0.034 1 
Change in Absolute Error  
(model 1) 
0.445 0.009 -0.007 -0.030 0.109 0.005 -0.008 0.014 0.016 -0.028 -0.037 -0.053 -0.009 
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Table B9 
Tobit models relating CEO relative debt-to-equity to possible firm and executive level determinants.  
Independent variables are described in Table B7 and in detail in the text. P-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Age 0.1208* 0.1685** 0.1527** 0.0830 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.37) 
     
Tenure -0.0004 0.0260 0.0603 0.0620 
 (1.00) (0.75) (0.45) (0.61) 
     
Firm Size -3.1192*** -2.2117*** -1.3431** -1.4855 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.11) 
     
Growth 
Opportunities 
20.1505** 25.0214*** 20.0350** 7.4792 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.41) 
     
Tax Status -2.1202* -0.9734 -0.3358 -1.2189 
 (0.07) (0.39) (0.76) (0.43) 
     
Liquidity 
Constraint 
2.9309 4.9367 6.8766** 12.8992*** 
(0.39) (0.13) (0.03) (0.01) 
     
AAA/AA 16.6220*** 12.8321*** 11.5403*** 13.4029 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) 
     
A 5.0126*** 5.6635*** 2.8621 -2.9410 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.11) (0.36) 
     
BBB 1.6624 2.2250 0.4965 -0.5981 
 (0.24) (0.11) (0.71) (0.76) 
     
Market to book 0.0034 0.0147 0.0115 -0.0039 
(0.84) (0.78) (0.83) (0.82) 
     
PP&E 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.25) (0.37) 
     
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
-0.4935 -2.5611 -1.8019 3.7625 
(0.92) (0.63) (0.73) (0.59) 
    
Outsider 
Percentage 
 3.3861 5.7874  
 (0.46) (0.19)  
    
ln(Board Size)  -5.9572** -5.9701**  
  (0.04) (0.04)  
     
GIM Index  -0.1232 -0.1076  
  (0.56) (0.60)  
     
Book Leverage   -39.3534*** -47.3779*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
    
Constant 64.9845*** 50.1101*** 42.2178*** 46.3403** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
N 2162 1878 1878 1082 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B10 
Abnormal returns to large decreases in the deviation from optimal debt compensation. 
Below are univariate tests comparing abnormal returns for firms with large decreases in absolute deviation to firms 
without large decreases. A large decrease is defined as a decrease in absolute error that is greater than the 90th 
percentile of decreases with the sample or subsample. In Panel A, all firms with available data are used. In Panel B, 
the tests are conducted using only firms where a positive reaction is more likely. For tests (1) – (4) in Panel B, the 
test is conducted on the subset of firms where the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was less than 1. For test (5) in Panel 
B, the test is conducted on the subset of firms that had a lower than optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity ratio per 
the model. For test (6), the test is conducted on the subset of firms with relatively weak governance. P-values are 
based on two-sided t-tests for the significance of mean standardized abnormal returns. P-values are based on one-
sided t-tests for the difference in means using standardized abnormal returns, which are explicitly predicted to be 
higher for the group with a large decrease. 
 
Panel A      
Test Model  Mean P-value Difference P-value 
       
(1) Optimal
=1 
Large Decrease  0.0082*** 0.0090   
 No Large Decrease 0.0032* 0.0764 0.0050** 0.0381 
       
(2) (1) Large Decrease  0.0000 0.4352   
  No Large Decrease 0.0040** 0.0162 -0.0040 0.2861 
       
(3) (2) Large Decrease 0.0040 0.1172   
  No Large Decrease 0.0036** 0.0314 0.0004 0.1389 
       
(4) (3) Large Decrease  0.0047 0.1918   
  No Large Decrease 0.0035** 0.0490 0.0012 0.2363 
       
(5) (4) Large Decrease  0.0012 0.6428   
  No Large Decrease 0.0037** 0.0410 -0.0025 0.5697 
       
Panel B       
 Model  Mean P-value Difference P-value 
(1) Optimal
=1 
Large Decrease  -0.0000 0.4626   
 No Large Decrease 0.0034 0.1950 0.0034 0.8367 
       
(2) (1) 
Large Decrease  0.0209 0.1117   
No Large Decrease 0.0011 0.6931 0.0198** 0.0224 
       
(3) (2) 
Large Decrease  0.0093* 0.0754   
No Large Decrease 0.0023 0.3199 0.0069** 0.0423 
       
(4) (3) 
Large Decrease  0.0104* 0.0771   
No Large Decrease 0.0023 0.6017 0.0081* 0.0622 
       
(5) (3) 
Large Decrease  0.0073 0.2811   
No Large Decrease 0.0021 0.2096 0.0052 0.3116 
       
(6) (4) 
Large Decrease  0.0118*** 0.0028   
No Large Decrease 0.0052** 0.0255 0.0066** 0.0295 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B11 
OLS regressions of abnormal returns to firm equity. 
Below are OLS regressions of abnormal returns on changes in absolute deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity and controls for changes in the CEO’s 
cash compensation. The change in absolute error is the change in the absolute value of the deviation from the optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity based on the model 
listed above each column. Change in salary is the change in the CEO’s salary from the previous to the current year. Change in bonus is the change in the CEO’s 
bonus from the previous to the current year. P-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 
 Optimal = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Δ Abs Error X 10-2 -0.0004 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0018 
(0.95) (0.69) (0.80) (0.78) (0.86) 
      
Δ Salary X 10-2 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.70) (0.62) (0.53) (0.56) (0.79) 
      
Δ Bonus X 10-2 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.40) (0.14) (0.28) (0.28) (0.47) 
      
Constant X 10-2 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0024** 0.0025** 0.0022** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
N 1771 904 904 904 904 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
9
4
 
Table B12 
Block-diagonal regressions of abnormal returns to firm equity. 
Below are block-diagonal regressions of abnormal returns on changes in absolute deviation from optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity and controls for changes in the 
CEO’s cash compensation. The impact of a change in the absolute deviation is allowed to differ for firms predicted to have greater reactions in our second hypothesis. 
For the first four columns, the impact is allowed to differ depending on whether the CEO’s relative debt-to-equity was greater than or less than 1. For column 5, the 
impact of is allowed to differ depending on whether the firm had a lower than optimal CEO relative debt-to-equity ratio, per the model. For column 6, the impact is 
allowed to differ depending on the firm’s institutional ownership. The change in absolute error is the change in the absolute value of the deviation from optimal CEO 
relative debt-to-equity. All variables are defined in Table B11. P-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 
 Optimal = 1 (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) 
       
Δ Abs Error X 10-2 
Relative was high 
0.0026 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0085  
(0.74) (0.99) (0.99) (0.96) (0.35)  
      
Δ Abs Error X 10-2 -0.0267*** -0.0333*** -0.0371*** -0.0432*** -0.0005  
Relative was low (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97)  
       
Δ Salary X 10-2 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.62) (0.51) (0.50) (0.48) (0.53) (0.48) 
       
Δ Bonus X 10-2 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.39) (0.30) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.27) 
       
Δ Abs Error X 10-2 
Good Governance 
     0.0138 
     (0.56) 
       
Δ Abs Error X 10-2      -0.0071 
Bad Governance      (0.38) 
       
Constant X 10-2 0.0022** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0026** 0.0025** 0.0025** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
N 1771 904 904 904 904 904 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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